Scottish Government

4. MAIN FINDINGS - SAFETY ISSUES

Transportation in Vehicles

4.1 Vehicles are not provided with seatbelts. ⁶ In the view of RCS, the risk of self-harm using seat belts outweighs the risk of injury in an accident. Prisoners interviewed during court inspections expressed many reservations about safety (largely the lack of seatbelts and the slippery seats), suggesting that this may be a general area of concern. Around 70% of those interviewed as part of this inspection indicated that they did not feel safe in the vehicle in the event of an accident. This is supported by the Prison Survey, where 58% reported feeling fairly unsafe, or very unsafe in the event of an accident.

4.2 Related to this, no prisoners interviewed as part of this inspection process (and only 4% of those surveyed as part of the Prison Survey) had been provided with information about what would happen in the event of an accident. For some, this clearly contributed to their feeling of a lack of safety. It is recommended that a brief announcement is made to prisoners in vehicles on the safety procedures to be followed in the event of an accident.

4.3 Overall, a very high percentage of prisoners questioned both as part of this inspection and in the Prison Survey suggested that they felt safe from staff and from other prisoners in vehicles. The main complaints were related to lack of access to a toilet, or to water.

Court Premises

4.4 There is a great variety of court buildings in use in Scotland. Some are used only as courts (although different types of court may sit in the same building), while some are part of a local authority office complex and, in two cases, a local authority leisure centre. As will be described later, some court buildings present difficult logistical challenges for RCS staff in moving prisoners between custody areas and court rooms.

Table 4. Courts single or multiple use

The nature of court rooms

4.5 Almost all courts have dedicated court rooms, although in the case of one court, a games hall is converted for use where required, and at another, a local authority meeting room is booked and the furniture rearranged.

The nature of custody areas

4.6 A total of 67 courts have dedicated cells, which may be either in the court building or an adjacent police station. Of these, 35 had three or fewer cells. Only three courts have more than 20 cells. In some cases, courts have cells located in different parts of the court building, allowing prisoners to be moved to a holding area adjacent to a court room in advance.

4.7 Only a small number of courts, generally larger sheriff courts, have a range of cell types available. Relatively few have observation cells. In very small courts, segregation may be a problem, particularly on days when female prisoners are present, or where prisoners may have to be kept separate (accepting that this would be rare in a small court). In these circumstances, RCS staff would generally use a vehicle as additional accommodation as necessary.

Courts with no dedicated cells

4.8 Among courts with no dedicated cells, a range of arrangements are in place. In seven courts, communal waiting areas are used. In some locations, these presented no specific security problems, while in others, inspectors noted a range of difficulties, including concerns about door and window locks, the availability of fitments which could be removed and difficulties in providing effective observation by staff.

4.9 In all of these locations, there is no practical means of separating male and female prisoners in the holding area. Again, a range of arrangements are in use, including requiring that female prisoners be held in a police custody unit, or in a vehicle pending their appearance. In one location, inspectors observed a female prisoner being walked across a busy street double cuffed to two RCS officers, before being held, again handcuffed, in a general office.

4.10 It is important to recognise that an appearance at a District Court is dictated by the seriousness of the offence, not the risk posed by the prisoner. Inspectors were generally satisfied that procedures were in place in these locations to deal with prisoners posing a risk of, for example, escape or violence, although, in a small number of courts issues were raised directly with RCS managers.

The Court of Appeal

4.11 A number of concerns relating to the Court of Appeal were raised during the inspection. These had been recognised prior to the inspection and plans were in place to relocate the court from its existing location. The Court of Appeal has subsequently been relocated.

Other arrangements

4.12 In most other locations, prisoners are kept either in a police custody unit, or the custody unit of a local sheriff court. In a number of cases, prisoners are routinely kept in the vehicle bringing them from police or prison custody.

4.13 At two locations, there is a police station with a secure custody unit adjacent to the court. RCS managers reported that they were, at the times of the inspections, unable to use the police custody units to house prisoners, even though this is permitted in other areas. In both cases, prisoners may be escorted into the police custody unit to use the toilet. However, at one of the courts RCS staff indicated that some prisoners had been forced to remain in a vehicle for over six hours, in addition to the extended travelling time from prison. This is unacceptable. It is recommended that a solution is found to the problems caused by the lack of access to appropriate secure holding facilities in some courts.

Documentation about Court Buildings and Procedures

Risk assessments

4.14 A risk assessment should be available for each court building, and should be regularly updated. Staff should be aware of its content, and should have procedures in place to deal with any issues identified (for example, relating to the management of prisoners in public areas).

4.15 At a significant minority of courts (24), the risk assessment folder was not available at the time of the inspection. In each case, local RCS staff indicated that this was held at the closest depot, or at the company's headquarters. There was no discernable pattern to whether or not the folder would be available. Among the courts where no risk assessment folder was available for inspection were very large courts and very small courts. The courts with no folders available were spread over all three RCS operational areas. It is recommended that risk assessment folders are available at all courts to ensure that any staff member, regardless of their usual base, can access them.

4.16 Among the courts where the risk assessment folder was available, all except two were current. In one case, it was being updated at the time of the inspection, in the other staff indicated that the content, although nominally out of date, remained valid.

4.17 The extent to which these were live documents, used routinely by staff, was not always clear. At some courts, it was indicated that staff were provided with an introduction to the content of the assessments as part of their induction, but this did not appear to happen in all courts.

Evacuation/emergency procedures

4.18 A policy should exist for each court building detailing all procedures to be followed in the event of an evacuation or other emergency. This should be regularly updated, and staff should be aware of its content.

4.19 In all courts, appropriate procedures were in place to deal with emergencies or an evacuation. In most cases, this would involve an evacuation to either a RCS vehicle, or into a secure area (with prisoners being handcuffed). In some cases, evacuation would be to a police custody suite.

4.20 Paradoxically, virtually all prisoners consulted during the Prisoner Survey, and spoken to as part of this inspection indicated that they were unaware of any emergency procedures in place at court.

Access for disabled prisoners

4.21 Many courts are inaccessible to prisoners with mobility impairments. It was clear from the inspection process that, in many of these courts, staff had little idea how they would manage a disabled prisoner.

4.22 In a small number of courts a contingency plan exists, but this is unusual. One court has a medi-chair available to allow prisoners to be carried up stairs, but again, this is unusual. At another court access is particularly good. The rear of the custody unit has a wheelchair-accessible ramp and there is an accessible toilet facility within the custody suite. There are wheelchairs available for moving less able prisoners to court and a lift has been installed that avoids the stairway to court.

4.23 It is recommended that a contingency plan should be developed for each court building to transfer prisoners with mobility difficulties effectively and safely. This plan should be available to all staff in court premises, and all staff should be provided with basic disability awareness training, and at least one member of staff should be trained in lifting and handling techniques.

General Security Issues

4.24 The Contract specifies that "the Service Provider must ensure overriding priority is given to the security and safety of the Prisoners in its custody" (1.1.5). Inspectors considered a wide range of security issues, in addition to those specified below.

4.25 A range of general security issues were identified during the course of court inspections. These were raised with RCS staff at the time, and will not be detailed here.

4.26 A large majority of prisoners spoken to as part of the inspection process and consulted as part of the Prisoner Survey reported feeling safe in court.

Security and visibility of the transfer of prisoners to and from vehicles

4.27 Given the age, location and lay out of court buildings, RCS staff face a wide range of scenarios in transferring prisoners to and from escort vehicles. Inspectors gave consideration to the extent to which the dignity of prisoners, and the safety of prisoners, staff and members of the public was effectively managed.

4.28 It is only at a small number of courts that RCS vehicles arrive at a secure vehicle dock, allowing prisoners to be transferred to court premises with no possibility of contact with the public, and, assuming proper procedures are followed, no chance of escape.

4.29 It was clear, however, that, in some locations, procedures are lax, or inappropriate practices appeared to be followed. For example, at a number of courts, external security gates are not routinely closed while a vehicle is in the "secure" dock, thus defeating their purpose. In a small number of cases, inner and outer doors are controlled by different agencies, leading to the possibility of a lack of coordination. At one court, Inspectors witnessed a practical example of this, with prisoners being transferred while both the roller shutter door of the vehicle dock, and the external roller shutter door of the compound were open, leaving a clear escape route for a prisoner minded to attempt this. RCS managers have been provided with details of the examples identified by inspectors, and these shortcomings should be addressed immediately. It is recommended that issues related to security and visibility of the transfer of prisoners to and from vehicles should be addressed immediately.

4.30 A small number of examples were provided of access to otherwise secure vehicle docks being restricted. In some cases, it was suggested that this was as a result of cars parked in these areas by court staff. RCS staff in one court suggested that they had had to suspend prisoner movements to allow senior court staff access to park their cars. This is unacceptable. It is recommended that action is taken to ensure that access to secure vehicle docks is not compromised by parked cars.

4.31 Some courts have a secure courtyard area in which RCS vehicles can park, allowing a secure and private access to court buildings. Generally, these areas were seen to pose few security risks, and provided an acceptable level of dignity for prisoners (assuming appropriate procedures were followed in relation to the operation of security gates).

Courts with insecure parking areas

4.32 The main area of concern from a security and safety standpoint lies with courts where vehicles have to park in insecure areas. At many courts, vehicles park on public streets, either because there is no secure, or private area, or because vehicles (particularly 14 cell vehicles) are too large to be accommodated.

4.33 At most of these courts, prisoners are double cuffed prior to leaving the vehicle, and are escorted in full public view into the court building. In some cases, the access is directly to the custody suite, but in some courts, prisoners are transferred through busy public areas.

4.34 Inspectors observed a number of occasions where members of the public were in close contact with prisoners, leaving open the risk of assault, or of items being passed. It was also clear that, in some locations, members of the public are able to heckle prisoners entering court. Similarly, on two occasions, inspectors witnessed family members attempt to approach a prisoner while he or she was being transferred to the court building. In some locations, RCS staff and police officers liaise to create a secure path (albeit still in public view), but this remains relatively unusual.

4.35 At some courts (including one location used by the High Court), vehicles may find it difficult to find a parking space adjacent to the court building, either due to vehicles already parked, or as a result of parking by other members of the public. This requires prisoners to be transferred through public streets unnecessarily (with the attendant risks this poses). At one court, for example, it was noted that RCS has been provided with only one parking space, while, on the day of the inspection, three vehicles were in attendance. It is recommended that steps are taken to ensure RCS vehicles are able to park adjacent to court buildings.

4.36 Inspectors identified four courts where aspects of the transfer process raised significant safety concerns for prisoners, members of the public and staff (both court and RCS), either as a result of the nature of the route used, or in relation to procedures which do not appear to exclude the risk of assault. One example was identified of poor procedures (arising from a lack of staff) which resulted in the custody area being left unattended while transfers were taking place. RCS managers have been provided with details of these courts. It is recommended that a number of issues relating to the supervision of prisoners during transfer to courts from vehicles are addressed immediately.

Visibility and safety in court premises

4.37 Prior to, and following a court appearance, prisoners generally are held either in a custody suite (which usually consists of one or more cells) or in a holding area (which may be a room). While, in some cases, these are adjacent to court rooms, or have a secure access route, this is by no means the case in all courts, and inspectors gave consideration to the extent to which the dignity of prisoners, and the safety of prisoners, staff and members of the public was effectively managed. Inspectors also assessed the safety of prisoners, staff and members of the public in all individual court rooms (for example, in terms of the security of the dock area, and the management of exits).

4.38 At a small number of courts, there was evidence of shortcomings in security on the route between custody suites and courtrooms. At one court, a fire escape was observed to be wedged open while prisoners were being transferred. At other courts, push-bar, or button controlled access doors are sited close to custody suites, allowing the possibility of public access either to prisoners being transferred, or to the custody suite itself. At one court, the custody suite is only separated from a public access by a grille gate.

4.39 At a majority of courts, movement is via a secure route where there is no possibility that prisoners may come into contact with members of the public, and where there is no likelihood of escape. For example, at some larger courts, access to the dock area is via a secure stairwell, with no public access (although a small number of example of poor practice were noted, including the use of these stairwells for extended periods as, in effect, additional holding areas).

4.40 At some courts movement from custody suite to court room is via public areas. This clearly poses some level of risk, although it appears that, in most locations, RCS staff, often with police assistance, attempt to ameliorate this risk, for example, by securing access doors when prisoners are being moved.

4.41 This is not the case in all courts, and in some cases, transfers were observed where members of the public would have been able to assault prisoners (or staff), or pass items, if they were minded to do so. At one court, RCS staff identified examples of being tripped or kicked by friends or relatives of prisoners when moving through public areas.

4.42 A further consequence of this is that, by default, prisoners are escorted double cuffed and accompanied by two or more custody officers while in full view of members of the public.

4.43 It is recommended that there is secure or private access to court rooms to reduce the risk of contact between prisoners and members of the public.

4.44 In most courts, the dock area is secure, and generally out of reach of members of the public. At a small number of courts, there is inadequate separation of the dock from public seating, either due to proximity or a lack of adequate screening. In one Sheriff Court, for example, there is no dock, and prisoners sit in what is, in effect, the first row of the public seating. Where concerns exist, RCS staff and police officers generally cooperate to ensure the safety and security of prisoners.

4.45 In some locations, CCTV is available to RCS staff covering (variously) car parks, vehicle docks, custody suites, transfer routes and holding cells adjacent to court rooms. In most cases, these systems appeared to be being used effectively, and cameras appeared to be well positioned. This was not the case in all locations, and in two courts, shortcomings in working practices were identified and raised immediately with RCS managers. It was clear in talking to RCS staff in some courts that there was an inadequate understanding of the procedures in place for monitoring CCTV. It is recommended that procedures for monitoring CCTV at all court locations are put in place.

Searching

4.46 Searching is a key aspect in ensuring the safety of prisoners, staff and members of the public. Prisoners are searched by RCS on transfer from police or prison custody, and inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the procedures in place for searching prisoners at the point of transfer from vehicle-based to court-based staff.

4.47 As observed, searching appeared to be carried out effectively. However, it is clear that smoking materials are sometimes taken into custody suites by prisoners. It is recommended that reasonable steps are taken to prevent prisoners from smoking in custody suites.

Cell sharing risk assessments

4.48 As reported earlier, RCS has a duty to ensure the safety and security of prisoners at all times, as well as to ensure the separation of, for example, male and female prisoners. A key aspect of this is how the process of allocating prisoners to cells is managed, and the role played by information contained within the PER. Inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the allocation process in all courts, and also assessed the contingency arrangements in place in courts where limits to the accommodation makes physical separation difficult.

4.49 RCS provided a summary of the factors taken into account in deciding cell allocation. These are:

• Warning markers on the prisoner's PER, including suicidal, sex offender, requires segregation or protection, self harmer or vulnerability, violence or history of assaults, enemies, infectious diseases, religious, racial and political beliefs, mental health difficulties, alcohol or drugs.
• Non compliance/unruly behaviour during court appearance or whilst being transferred from prison or police custody.
• Cells available.
• Numbers of male and female prisoners.
• Numbers of juveniles.
• Climate within cell area (if hot and humid then occupancy will be kept to as low as possible).
• Convicted or remand prisoners and prisoners from Police custody.

4.50 Cell sharing allocations are almost always made on the day by RCS staff, largely on the basis of information contained on the PER, supplemented by information provided by prisoners themselves. This process relies on the information being accurate, up to date and comprehensive, and it is clear from comments by RCS staff that this is not always the case. This report has recommended that an audit is carried out of the reliability of risk information contained in PERs (Recommendation 8.1).

4.51 A particular area for concern is where prisoners are brought from a number of prisons. In these circumstances, sending establishments have no way of knowing whether any known enemies will be present at court. RCS staff suggested that the only way they could deal with this was to respond to prisoners' own concerns.

4.52 At some courts, it is not clear how staff could effect the segregation of prisoners due to a lack of space. This could affect the safety of vulnerable people.

Overview

4.53 The key points to emerge from this chapter are:

• Prisoners feel safe from staff and other prisoners in vehicles.
• In all courts, appropriate procedures were in place to deal with emergencies or an evacuation.
• Where concerns exist about the security of the dock area in courts, RCS staff and police officers generally co-operate to ensure the safety and security of prisoners.
• There is a wide variation in the nature of courts across Scotland in terms of layout, logistics, conditions and facilities. In the vast majority of cases, it is clear that RCS procedures are effective in managing these variations.
• Some courts do give rise to serious concerns about aspects of prisoners' safety and dignity. The key concerns arise in locations where is it very difficult for RCS to adequately protect prisoners (or themselves) from attack by a member of the public, or where it is difficult to guarantee that a member of public would be able to pass an item to a prisoner.
• The layout of some courts (as well as some of the arrangements in place) expose prisoners to unnecessary public scrutiny.
• At some courts, parking by court staff interferes with RCS operations.
• Some courts do not allow effective segregation of different classifications of prisoner, leading to some pragmatic, but potentially insecure, locations being used to hold prisoners.
• The physical security of some court buildings is poor.
• Prisoners in some locations are being kept in vehicles (in cramped and often hot conditions) until police custody units become available.
• The information available on PERs is inconsistent. This is a major source of concern given the central importance of the PER in managing the prisoner safely. Cell sharing allocations are carried out largely on the basis of the information on PERs. If the information is inadequate, it is difficult to see how RCS staff can make effective decisions.
• RCS procedures mean that, at some smaller courts, staff from a range of depots may operate the court. It is a matter of some concern that necessary security and risk information is not always held at these courts. Staff must have access to necessary information without recourse to their line managers.
• Access for disabled prisoners is generally poor, and there appear to be few contingency arrangements in place to address this.
• Although there were few concerns identified in the inspection in relation to emergency procedures, there is some concern among prisoners about the lack of safety information being provided to them about both the transportation process and holding periods at court.