Scottish Government

Chapter 4 Partnership Working

4.1 Introduction

As previously indicated within this report, HMIC acknowledges the opportunities which currently exist to improve the services delivered by partnerships through enhanced intelligence and information sharing. It is now more apparent than ever that meeting customer needs can most effectively and efficiently be achieved through partnership working. The outcomes reached by partnerships will be enriched if successful systems and procedures for intelligence and information sharing are achieved.

4.2 Community Planning

The Local Government in Scotland Act 2003 places a statutory obligation on local authorities to initiate, facilitate and maintain community planning. It also requires other key partners, including the police, to participate in the two main aims of the community planning process, which are to ensure that:

• people and communities are genuinely engaged in the decisions made on public services that affect them; and
• organisations are committed to working together, not apart, in providing better public services.

The main components of the Act include a duty to secure Best Value, a power to advance well-being, a statutory basis for community planning and a framework for the better delivery of public services.

The aims of community planning are supported by two further principles:

• that community planning is the key over-arching partnership framework helping to co-ordinate initiatives and partnerships and where necessary acting to rationalise and simplify a cluttered landscape; and
• the ability of community planning to improve the connection between national priorities and those at regional, local and neighbourhood levels.

Recognising community planning as the key overarching partnership framework reflects the fact that it should not be an additional or parallel process. Rather it should should act as the umbrella partnership arrangement for other partnerships and initiatives at regional, local and neighbourhood level. The essence of community planning is collective or collaborative working, as well as the integration of the various planning and service delivery functions of the local authority and other community planning partners for the purpose of identifying and solving problems, improving services, and sharing resources.

Community planning operates at various structural levels within local authority areas, from the pan-authority strategic partnerships to local, neighbourhood or thematic partnerships. The importance of having effective information sharing structures within this process is obvious, even though delivering information sharing arrangements in practice can sometimes be complex.

At a strategic level, information from various sources is used to inform policy and evaluate the outcomes of policy and practice. This allows strategic partners to pose the question: "Is what we are doing separately and in partnership having any effect?"

At the tactical or themed partnership level, where community safety partnerships, drug and alcohol action teams, anti-social behaviour units, criminal justice and child protection inter-agency committees operate, data sets from the various statutory, community and public bodies involved in the community planning process can be over-laid. This contributes to a greater shared knowledge of the topic under scrutiny, so that cause and effect, or correlation, can be better understood and joint tactical operations planned. An example of this might be to examine how drugs trafficking enforcement and heroin seizures are related, if at all, to issues such as availability, socio-economic landscape, methadone prescription rates, uptake of counselling services, reports of heroin dealing activity and drug deaths, and whether this understanding will lead to a total knowledge which is greater than the sum of its parts.

At the operational, local or neighbourhood level, partnership groupings will include local anti-social behaviour task forces, case-specific conferences, neighbourhood management groups, problem-oriented policing partnerships sometimes known as problem solving partnerships, and so on. In these groups, information sharing arrangements between partners will focus mainly on data concerning locations, victims, offenders or suspects. It must be acknowledged that there is the likelihood of an overlap, as some of this information will also be discussed at the tactical level. It is vital that each partner brings all the relevant data to the partnership table so that the full picture can be viewed. However, much of this information will be of a personal or sensitive nature; caveats must be in place to ensure that it is only used for the purpose intended and complies with all the relevant legislation, or that information is redacted to conceal identities. It is perhaps at this level, when dealing with personal or sensitive information, that the greatest challenges exist.

During the inspection HMIC found that all forces were engaging in the community planning process, with perhaps the most developed information sharing partnership structures being found in the work associated with anti-social behaviour. This progress has no doubt been assisted by the introduction of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Anti-Social Behaviour etc (Scotland) Act 2004, both of which articulated processes and procedures and gave power to share information to further the main purposes of the legislation.

4.3 Community Safety Partnerships

HMIC found that, unsurprisingly, community safety and anti-social behaviour have emerged as core themes in most community plans. Community safety partnerships have become important decision-making and delivery mechanisms within community planning. In the report 'Threads of Success' (Scottish Executive, November 2002) the following COSLA definition of community safety was recognised as being accepted by the majority of community safety partnerships:

"protecting people's right to live in confidence and without fear for their own or other people's safety".

This embraces a range of issues including crime reduction, domestic abuse, drug and alcohol abuse, road safety, fire safety and accident prevention. As intimated in HMCIC's Annual Report for 2005-06, the Inspectorate believes it is unrealistic to use the incidence of total recorded crime (or the crime rate as it is more commonly known) as a measure of police performance. So many factors outwith the control or influence of policing activity affect the crime rate that it makes more sense for reducing crime to be seen as a partnership responsibility - shared at national level between Government and national public services as well as the crucially important private sector, and at local level between those engaged in community planning.

'Threads of Success' recommended that community safety partnerships build a platform for partnership by establishing a three-tier structure, not unlike that used within the National Intelligence Model:

• senior partners group (to commit the organisation, direct, agree and review action);
• operations group (to manage, task and implement); and
• task groups (to deliver on key priorities).

Local data sharing partnerships, referred to in Chapter 2 (page 15), are being established in the 14 health board areas across Scotland. Their role is to provide electronic data sharing in the partnership area within the national policy priorities and frameworks.

HMIC believes that an opportunity exists to develop the use of the local data sharing partnership structure further in the future, to facilitate data sharing arrangements for community safety partnerships. A challenge too, will be reconciling the differing boundaries that exist between the 32 community safety partnerships in each local authority area with the 14 health board areas.

4.4 The Edinburgh Community Safety Partnership

During this inspection HMIC found a range of effective models for managing community safety issues. Elements of particularly good practice were observed in the Edinburgh Community Safety Partnership ( ECSP) business model. The Partnership was restructured in 2004 to reflect the recommendations for a three-tier structure in 'Threads of Success'. It is important to note that Lothian and Borders Police re-organised itself some three years ago to create one large policing division for Edinburgh, co-terminous with the City of Edinburgh Council boundary. One of the main aims of this re-organisation was to facilitate effective partnership working of this kind.

The ECSP meets quarterly and is made up of elected members, chief officers and heads of service representing the partner agencies. The main function of the partnership is to provide scrutiny and leadership as well as to monitor the performance and delivery of the key targets laid out in its community safety strategy, including priority elements from the police divisional control strategy. This is effectively the 'senior partners' or strategic steering group.

In addition to the strategic meeting, there are a number of strategic working groups for main work areas such as anti-social behaviour. Scrutiny of the partnerships work is provided through the City of Edinburgh Council Communities Scrutiny Panel as well as the Council Executive.

The ECSP has invested in two dedicated partnership analyst posts which are funded by the partnership and employed by Lothian and Borders Police within its divisional intelligence unit. These analysts have access to information from all of the partners and are responsible for creating a number of information products that are essential to the effective working of the National Intelligence Business model in force.

The community safety strategy was developed following a comprehensive audit of relevant aggregated or non-personal data gathered from many of the partners, undertaken by the Community Safety Unit of the City of Edinburgh Council.

The information collated included:

• Lothian and Borders Police: incident data, road traffic accidents statistics and crime statistics.
• City of Edinburgh Council Housing Department: anti-social behaviour data.
• Council Environmental and Consumer Services: noise nuisance data.
• Education Department: information on school exclusions.
• Lothian and Borders Fire and Rescue Service: dwelling house fire data, statistics regarding attacks on fire crews and data on secondary fire setting.
• NHS Lothian: information on household accidents.
• Edinburgh Royal Infirmary Accident and Emergency Department: relevant data concerning admissions as a result of violence, accidents in the home, alcohol consumption, drug deaths, road collisions and poisonings.
• British Transport Police: data regarding crime and incidents both at stations and on routes.
• The Youth Justice Partnership: findings from an academic study of youth transitions and crime and SCRA data on relevant referrals to the Children's Reporter.
• Victim Support: information on certain referral categories.
• Edinburgh Drug and Alcohol Action Team: data on the arrest referral scheme and child alcohol consumption information.
• Edinburgh Racial Incident Monitoring Project: information on the remote reporting of racially motivated incidents or crimes.

By analysing this extensive range of information, priority areas for ECSP activity were established. These priority areas form the basis for the partnership control strategy, as well as the focus for activity in the partnership tactical assessment document which the analysts produce monthly. Policing priority areas, identified from the police divisional level 1 tactical assessment document, are also included within the partnership tactical assessment document. This enables a degree of joint or complementary objective-setting as well as providing a structured basis for partnership tasking and collaborative working arrangements.

A monthly tactical tasking and co-ordinating group meeting provides a tactical focus to the delivery of key initiatives and targets from the strategy. The group is made up of service managers from the range of partners, is jointly chaired by police and local authority officers, and provides a responsive function to ongoing events. The group has sought to adapt the principles of the National Intelligence Model, described in Chapter 2, into a partnership business model so that its agenda is set by a monthly 'partnership' tactical assessment document. This allows the group to remain focused on action.

As well as identifying actions to tackle particular incidents and events, the partnership tactical tasking and co-ordinating group manages a problem-solving fund. This is accessible to all agencies through an established problem-oriented policing or problem-solving partnership ( PSP) structure.

This formal problem-solving partnership approach is now in its third year in Edinburgh. Though primarily aimed at council, police and fire and rescue officers, formal training is given to all agencies. Centred on the ' SARA' model, which involves the scanning, analysis, research of and selection from, a range of possible responses, and assessment of the results, locally based officers are encouraged to form PSPs. Each is supported by the partnership analysts and is required to be registered with the City of Edinburgh Council Community Safety Unit. A problem profile document is created at the start and end of the PSP so that input can be assessed against output and outcomes. Although encouraged to use available resources where possible, PSPs are able to make bids for additional resources to the monthly partnership tactical tasking and co-ordinating group, and link with the police divisional tactical tasking and co-ordinating group.

Conclusion

Only through sharing information from all the partners could a complete assessment of the problem be realised. The resulting multi-agency actions as a result of this knowledge contributed to the following decreases in comparison to the same period in the previous year: vandalism -16%; youth calls -20%; abandoned stolen vehicles -50%; and complaints to police involving harassment to pedestrians and cyclists -52%. In addition, there were no reported incidents of fireraising.

The approach adopted in Edinburgh, reflected by degrees in other parts of the country, is welcomed by HMIC as a valid and successful attempt to incorporate the principles of the NIM and an effective problem-solving methodology into partnership business.

The National Intelligence Model is by no means the only way that this kind of synergy and progress can be achieved. But it is certainly the only model of its type which is used and understood by all police forces in Scotland, and by an increasing number of their key partners in community safety. It makes eminent sense for this trend to be replicated everywhere in Scotland so that a common language and methodology is understood and practiced, and so that advances and good practice can be rapidly shared.

4.5 Glasgow Anti-Social Behaviour Task Force

During the inspection the development of Glasgow's approach to anti-social behaviour was brought to HMIC's attention. The model has been applied to ten Glasgow Council wards at the operational or task group level, with the purpose of tackling anti-social behaviour in these areas (there are plans to extend this to all Glasgow wards in a significant re-structuring programme for services).

The anti-social behaviour Task Force brings together all the various agencies who can contribute to the overall aim of reducing anti-social behaviour. Functions concerned with private landlord registrations, victims and vulnerable persons, community relations, Street Watch (public space CCTV), services for young people, restorative justice, neighbourhood management services, neighbour relations, Greater Glasgow Housing Association and Strathclyde Police (including an enforcement team) have established very effective and co-ordinated joint working, with information sharing arrangements which are articulated in a joint protocol.

Associated with the group is a Police Information Unit, consisting of an inspector, an analyst co-ordinator and an administrator. The Unit works very closely with the task force analyst, collaborating in the creation of intelligence products.

The Unit receives information from sources across the partnership, including the Strathclyde Police command and control (incident recording) system, the Scottish Intelligence Database, the Strathclyde Police crime recording system, pro-forma reports submitted by community support wardens, and various reports and spreadsheets updated daily from each of the sections of the Task Force and the Fire and Rescue Service. Liaison on emerging issues takes place on a daily basis between the inspector in the Information Unit and the local police divisional intelligence officers.

The principal products of the information unit are as follows:

• Tactical assessment - This is the main product of the Unit. It is created every four weeks and forms the basis for discussion at the Task Force tasking and co-ordinating group ( TACG) meeting. The Task Force TACG meets the day after the police divisional TACGs. The inspector attends both, along with the sergeant from the police enforcement team. The tactical assessment contains information on seasonal trends and gives crime trends for the year. The content centres on a control strategy based on the anti-social behaviour priorities, gives details on suspected offenders, locations and victims and recommends preventative measures, information/intelligence requirements and enforcement options.
• Daily briefings - Information regarding anti-social behaviour is extracted from the force command and control system on a daily basis. It is distributed to the Task Force partners but is primarily aimed at the neighbourhood community support officers to enable tasked hot spot patrolling.
• Weekly offending briefing - This is a list of all anti-social behaviour offences committed during the previous week, where a suspected offender has been charged. It shows the name of the suspected offender, the offence committed and the location of the offence.
• Problem profiles - Work here falls into two distinct categories: 1) the Unit will help to produce police divisional problem profiles when related to anti-social behaviour in their areas; and 2) they produce their own Anti-Social Behaviour Task Force problem profiles for areas which are causing particular problems or are hot-spot locations for anti-social behaviour.
• Target profiles - The information contained in these documents is centred on offenders or persons suspected of committing anti-social offences. These products will also contain information on a subject's possible criminal associates and other relevant social material. Offending patterns are tied to a GIS mapping system. These documents are mainly for the use of the Task Force Case Management Unit which will be tasked with actions.
• Communications report - this is an internal document for use by the Task Force. It gives statistics from each Department in the Task Force and indicates who is dealing with specific cases.

The Task Force has a tasking and co-ordinating group meeting every month, with a progress meeting at two-week intervals. The agenda for this meeting is taken from the Information Unit's tactical assessment. At this meeting there is open and frank discussion about anti-social behaviour, with an emphasis on hot-spot locations, victims and perpetrators/suspects. Tactics are discussed and agreed and tasks allocated to the multi-agency team. A good example of the effectiveness of these collaborative working arrangements is given in the case study below.

The Glasgow Anti-Social Behaviour Task Force operates a business model styled on the National Intelligence Model and linked to the police divisional tasking and co-ordinating groups. It enables prompt action to be taken to address trends and challenges in the priority areas, as defined by the agreed and published strategy, and also allows for constant monitoring of performance in these areas. HMIC believes that this is an effective structure for delivering joined-up services for anti-social behaviour.

Conclusion

Although still at an early stage, initial analysis has shown a significant decrease in reported crime, of about 80%, and a drop in reported incidents to the police of about 60%. However a longer-term evaluation will need to be carried out to highlight any sustainable impact that these initiatives have made.

Conclusion

HMIC is in no doubt that the free exchange of information, including personal information where appropriate, has been the basis of the success enjoyed by this kind of partnership. Free information exchange, within the terms of agreed protocols, enables collaborative working in local service provision that improves the well-being of the local community.

4.6 The Impact of Recent Legislation on Community Safety Information Sharing

The principles and requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 ( DPA) have been highlighted previously within Chapter 2 of this report (para 25). From an information sharing perspective, organisations that process personal data must take due cognisance of the data protection principles at every stage.

The Anti-Social Behaviour Etc (Scotland) Act 2004 introduced new provisions relating to applications for interim and full anti-social behaviour orders ( ASBOs) by local authorities or registered social landlords. Section 139 of this Act makes clear provision for disclosing and exchanging information, where this is necessary or desirable to fulfil duties imposed by the 2004 Act or any other legislation relating to anti-social behaviour.

It should also be noted that the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2002 similarly have a significant bearing on the investigation of anti-social behaviour. The Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 further provides the statutory basis for local authorities and registered social landlords to make informed decisions about tenancies on the grounds of anti-social behaviour.

As partnership working arrangements have evolved and grown, releasing sensitive police information to partners has become an important element. There is no doubt that the DPA was initially viewed by some as inhibiting legislation and that there was reluctance to share information fully - either because of, or at least supported by, that misinterpretation. To overcome these challenges and to place information sharing on a more formal and structured footing, most forces entered into information sharing protocols with their main partners.

Such sharing is normally undertaken within guidelines or protocols agreed between organisations at the appropriate level. Accepted best practice is that the preparation of these documents should involve consultation with expert advisers (generally within the organisations concerned). These may include those who are knowledgeable in the relevant legal, data protection, freedom of information and information security matters, so as to give assurance that the ultimate 'owners' of the information, such as chief executives and chief constables, are appropriately and lawfully processing the information.

The legislative landscape can seem quite complex to the untrained practitioner, often resulting in confusion and doubt as to what information can be shared with partners. Simply explained, much information concerning community safety is already in the public domain, having been de-personalised and aggregated into statistics showing trends and patterns rather than identifying individuals. It is safe to say that this type of information falls outwith Data Protection requirements. However, any information from which a person's identity can be deduced (i.e. case-specific) does fall under the scope of the Data Protection Act and reasonable care must be taken to ensure that there are no unlawful disclosures. It is for the legitimate and necessary handling of this kind of information that the majority of protocols have been developed.

4.7 Information Sharing Protocols

Perhaps because of the way that the information sharing landscape has evolved, along with the emergence of the importance of partnership working in service delivery and the formalisation of community planning arrangements under the Local Government in Scotland Act 2003, a somewhat un-coordinated picture has emerged with regard to information sharing protocols.

This inspection confirmed that each police force in Scotland has now developed a number of such protocols with partner agencies. These range from protocols for information sharing under section 139 of the Anti-Social Behaviour etc (Scotland) Act 2004, which almost every local authority area has although the content and format differ slightly, to protocols for child protection information, for information relating to 'houses in multiple occupancy', and for sharing information with local businesses. An audit by one of the larger forces found 36 different protocols in place at the time of the inspection.

However, there was little evidence of a corporate approach to the production of these protocols within forces. The majority of forces did not maintain a central register of protocols and the protocols were not readily accessible to staff. In most cases senior officers from the partner agencies signed the protocols to activate them and most had designated signatories. There was little evidence of any auditing arrangements to ensure that protocols remained relevant and appropriate for purpose. HMIC believes that the range of protocols should be examined and a degree of uniform information management introduced.

As previously explained in Chapter 2 of this report (page 27), the police service is Scotland has agreed to adopt the ACPO manual of guidance for the Management of Police Information ( MOPI). An amended version to reflect the Scottish landscape was being developed at the time of inspection, to be implemented in the near future.

One of the key features of the guidance is the requirement for each organisation to develop an overarching information management strategy, which explains how they will manage information in relation to collection, recording, evaluation, retention, review and disposal, records management and information sharing.

There are a number of identifiable benefits in adopting the guidance in the MOPI manual, including better data standards, quality assurance, integration and linking of information systems, and standardised information sharing protocols. All are intended to ensure that the risks associated with information management can be minimised.

Adopting the standardised protocol templates included in the MOPI manual should result in broadly the same protocol for the same subject being used, regardless of the locality in Scotland. The MOPI implementation team envisages that template protocols will articulate all the issues that should be covered and highlight the issues that must be covered. Slight local variations may then be applied to reflect local issues/structures. The aim is that protocols will be produced in terminology that practitioners will find easy to understand and interpret.

HMIC believes that there is merit in considering an overarching strategic, Scotland-wide 'in principle' or generic protocol, under which a 'family' of protocols would sit.

4.8 Criminal Justice System Partnership

Following devolution, Scottish Ministers recognised the need to reform the criminal justice system to produce, inter alia, speedier justice and more efficient service. It is widely acknowledged that speedier justice is more effective justice, not least for victims of crime and communities, but also for offenders.

Subsequent reviews, notably the Normand, Bonomy and McInnes reports, tackled the pinch-points and the resulting 'churn' of cases. An objective of the Normand report on prosecutions was "[t]o improve efficiency and deal with cases with appropriate speed", while Lord Bonomy's remit for the High Court included "... to make recommendations with a view to making better use of Court resources in promoting the interests of justice". Furthermore, one of the recommendations of the McInnes Report was "[t]o ensure more efficient handling of cases, prepared earlier and more effectively". The Bonomy reforms, albeit directed at courts carrying the least volume (but the most serious) of cases, have already contributed to a 144% rise in early guilty pleas, a 70% saving in witness citations, and 96% of trials proceeding on the day assigned or the following day.

One of the Scottish Executive's responses to the Normand Report (published in 2003) was to set up a National Criminal Justice Board, comprising leading figures from each of the organisations/professions involved in the criminal justice system in Scotland. One of the four system goals of the national board is that:

"Continuous improvement is delivered by using more efficient and effective processes."

Eleven local Criminal Justice Boards were phased in later with boundaries designed around the six sheriffdoms. At national and local level this has united major players in criminal justice in a commitment to work together to improve justice. There must always be due, proper and very visible separation of powers in the investigation, prosecution and trial of alleged offenders, and Scottish criminal justice and its practitioners have guarded and will continue to guard that separation robustly. However, HMIC is encouraged to see that, without compromising these principles, today's practitioners are showing the necessary clarity of thought and breadth of vision to make important strides forward in improving the way justice is delivered.

In order to support and contribute to these recent and continuing reforms, ACPOS established the Criminal Justice Business Area in 2005. Its remit is to build partnerships within the criminal justice community, maximise the performance of the police service in Scotland in all aspects of the criminal justice system, and engage with partners in the reform programme. HMIC acknowledges the work that is currently being undertaken at national and regional level in preparation for the proposed reforms outlined in the Criminal Proceedings (Reform) Scotland Bill.

It is widely accepted that to achieve improvements in the quality and timeliness of criminal justice processes, enhanced information sharing between partners will be essential. HMIC believes that this does not simply mean sharing more and different types of information, but also requires a more efficient exchange of existing information.

The police service has by far the largest share of resources (and so represents the most cost to the public purse) in Scottish criminal justice. It is therefore perhaps ironic that in the past the service seems to have had the least influence on justice procedures and processes. Historically police resources have been used in other parts of the CJS (e.g. in running court business, escorting prisoners, the long-term storage of productions, citing witnesses, etc.). And of course in so doing, many police hours were, and in some cases still are, diverted from front-line service.

Enlightened thinking on the part of Scottish Ministers, Law Officers and other criminal justice partners, particularly since devolution, has improved things enormously. Inroads are being made into many historical inefficiencies. However, advances in technology and in the types of information which can be secured and used as evidence in courts, mean that new challenges in capturing, exchanging and processing information between partners will continue to arise. HMIC cautions all those engaged in the constructive and co-operative work underway to learn from the past. This means taking care not to add to the administrative burden of the operational police officer, nor unnecessarily to increase demand on the support services in police forces, simply because doing so seems to present the easiest short term option.

The West Lothian Criminal Justice Pilot was designed from the outset as a continuous improvement model. By extending its existing formalised structure the model is set to develop further, with the inclusion of additional partners and the move from data exchange to data sharing.

Improving information sharing requires parties to share data across organisational boundaries consistently and within an agreed framework. The structure should provide security and engender the confidence to share information in all individuals involved. The system will only operate effectively if the structure meets the needs of all the partners in delivering the final product. Achieving improved information sharing within the criminal justice business area, as with all business areas, requires a collective, unified approach.

HMIC is aware that one of the four system goals of the National Criminal Justice Board is to arrive at a state where: "continuous improvement is delivered by using more efficient and effective processes". This report underlines the need for that goal and suggests that review of existing information sharing and exchange processes will be one of the means by which it can be achieved.

The inspection identified parts of Scotland where area procurators fiscal are actively involved in the community planning tactical assessment process. HMIC suggests that sharing NIM data with COPFS should be encouraged for the benefit of both organisations. In several areas the practice of police sharing the identified top ten criminals with the procurator fiscal was helping to reduce crime and increasing public re-assurance. During interviews with COPFS representatives, HMIC noted their enthusiasm for improved data sharing with the police. COPFS recognises the value of PF involvement in the tasking and co-ordinating process, where this provides fiscals with essential information about police priorities and the reasoning behind them. Whilst not affecting their independence, such knowledge can assist PFs when formulating their decisions "in the public interest".

4.9 ViSOR - Violent Offender and Sex Offender Register

ViSOR (the Violent Offender and Sex Offender Register) is a UK information technology solution to facilitate information sharing about registered and unregistered sex offenders, violent offenders, dangerous offenders and otherwise potentially dangerous people.

Before an offender or any other person can be included on ViSOR they must either have a criminal conviction for an appropriate offence or have another valid reason for being included. Each case is determined on its own merits, following a joint-agency case conference or similar within the relevant force/agency area and based on the evidence/information available.

At present those records held on ViSOR by Scottish forces relate to both registered sex offenders and those unregistered offenders whose current behaviour is of concern. There are currently approximately 3,000 such nominals 'owned' by Scottish forces.

Where a nominal record exists on ViSOR and that individual ceases to be actively monitored by police/criminal justice social work ( CJSW), then the record will be held in an archive within ViSOR. It nevertheless remains retrievable.

Each record within ViSOR has an identified owner who is responsible for the day to day management of that person. Should a ViSOR user not connected to a specific nominal view a record, then a message that this record has been viewed and by whom is sent to the owner. All users are required to enter full contact details on their initial log-in to ViSOR and must ensure these are kept fully up to date.

Each offender nominal record contains a diary page. Any appropriate dates/events relating to the individual concerned are recorded therein. These events are thereafter allocated to and populate the diaries of key workers within the appropriate organisations.

ViSOR supports the risk management and assessment process. It has the facility to record and store current and historical risk assessments using the Risk Matrix 2000 (RM2k), which is an accredited assessment model. While RM2k is a static tool, ViSOR maintains a capability to acknowledge dynamic factors when managing risk. The assessment is linked to risk management plans where actions, decisions, results etc, can be recorded. Responsibility for designated tasks is allocated to identified individuals.

The system has two separate retrieval facilities. The 'find' page permits the user to search on the basis of known nominal details. The 'search' page is for enquiries of a speculative nature. Information about personal physical appearance, including photographs, is held on ViSOR in 'time-slices'. This allows for searches to be carried out in cases of historical complaints.

Every police force in the United Kingdom now has access to ViSOR, and information on each nominal record held within can be viewed and updated anywhere in the country. Where ViSOR nominals are known to cross identified borders, partner status can be allocated to a user in any other police or local authority area.

Trained criminal justice social workers in four local authorities (Fife, Dundee, Dumfries and Galloway and Stirling) now have access to ViSOR. Service managers of the remaining local authority CJSW units are now being engaged to roll out ViSOR to all 32 authorities.

The Scottish Intelligence Database ( SID) described earlier in this report is the single over-arching database for assessed intelligence about criminals residing in Scotland ( Chapter 2, page 24), although the Serious and Organised Crime Agency ( SOCA) maintains an independent database which it will interrogate on request from Scottish forces. The SID contains details of criminals, associations, vehicles and activities in a single location, access to which is available to officers throughout Scotland. All information input to the SID has its provenance recorded and graded using what is known as the '5x5x5' system. This is a tool which allows the police service to manage information which has an associated risk, discussed later at page 54. It has been developed in conjunction with the National Intelligence Model and is compliant with the Human Rights Act and data protection legislation. Information held on SID is reviewed on a regular basis to ensure that it continues to meet the standard grounds for retaining and disseminating intelligence.

While ViSOR has a searchable intelligence capability, it is primarily a management and assessment tool. In the absence of an equivalent to SID, police forces in England and Wales are using ViSOR in an intelligence capacity. All ViSOR nominals being managed in Scotland will also be held on SID.

An interface between the SID, ViSOR and Automatic Number Plate Recognition ( ANPR) system has been devised. But before this can be implemented, PITO (the UK serving Police Information Technology Organisation) will need to upgrade the systems. The systems will communicate by means of unique reference numbers relating to each nominal record.

It is proposed that, subject to appropriate checks and controls, relevant intelligence which is input to the SID will be electronically transferred to ViSOR, and vice versa. The information will be monitored by gate-keepers at both ends to ensure validity and quality control. Rules, conventions and data standards have been devised for ViSOR, in keeping with those already in existence for SID which were based on HOLMES standards, but final decisions had still to be taken about the detail of this arrangement at the time of writing.

Intelligence gathered by ANPR will be channelled to SID and sanitised before being transmitted to ViSOR where relevant. Conversely a ViSOR user will be able to provide SID with, for example, details of a new vehicle used by a sex offender. This intelligence can then be automatically placed on ANPR, with the results of any hits being sent back directly via SID to the ViSOR user.

HMIC acknowledges and supports the progress that has been made with the ViSOR database and its increased linkage to partner agencies.

4.10 Management of Offenders etc. (Scotland) Act 2005

A national support team has been established to lead and facilitate the significant changes in culture and joint working practices required for implementation of the Management of Offenders etc. (Scotland) Act 2005. The legislation and new structures should be a catalyst for change. In addition, new service developments such as the use of risk assessment tools, integrated case management and a single accreditation panel, are providing tools to help change take root. But success can only be assured when people commit to change. The team has therefore been given a remit to lead in developing a cultural change programme. Its make-up reflects the integrated approach necessary to achieve the objectives set out in the strategy, with members from all the key partner agencies. The team will facilitate discussion on the opportunities created by the introduction of Community Justice Authorities ( CJAs) to forge stronger local partnerships which can address the wider needs of offenders and help to reduce offending.

CJAs were established in April 2006 but will not take up their full range of activities until April 2007. As a partner body the police will have to engage with the CJAs, whose functions will include integrated sentence planning, consistent case management and improvements in information sharing.

Sections 10 and 11 of the Management of Offenders etc. (Scotland) Act 2005 introduce a statutory function for the police, local authorities and the Scottish Prison Service ( SPS) to establish joint arrangements for assessing and managing the risk posed by sexual and violent offenders. These will include the National Health Service ( NHS) where the sexual and violent offenders are also mentally disordered offenders. The Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland ( ACPOS), the Association of Directors of Social Work ( ADSW), and the SPS are working with the Scottish Executive Justice Department to set up Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements ( MAPPAs) in Scotland.

MAPPAs will operate on the following four principles of good practice: defensible decisions; rigorous risk assessment; risk management plans that match the identified public protection needs; and evaluation of performance to improve delivery. They will also have four core functions:

• identifying MAPPA offenders;
• sharing relevant information among those agencies involved in the assessment of risk;
• assessing the risk of serious harm;
• managing that risk.

MAPPAs are based on inter-agency working, not just between lead agencies but with other agencies such as housing and health who will have a duty to co-operate with the MAPPAs. Similarly, voluntary sector agencies will also have a duty to co-operate as appropriate. The CJAs provide the infrastructure within which the MAPPAs will sit, and each MAPPA will be responsible for reporting annually on performance through the CJA to the National Advisory Body.

From April 2007 the full responsibilities of CJAs will additionally include disbursement of funds provided by the Scottish Executive for community based criminal justice social work services, and monitoring the operational delivery of the services provided.

All CJAs have begun work on area plans for 2007-2008 which follow framework guidance. Every police force in Scotland is represented in the appropriate CJA and is submitting information to assist in its CJA area plan. Although the structure of the framework guidance is standard across Scotland, each CJA has differing priorities influenced by local issues.

4.11 Integration of Scottish Criminal Justice Information Systems ( ISCJIS) Development

In June 1996, as a result of the work of the ISCJIS Programme Board, the principal organisations of the Scottish criminal justice system were electronically linked for transmitting information.

At a basic level, ISCJIS is currently able to transfer information electronically between selected criminal justice partners, through what is known as the 'primary loop'. The ISCJIS programme has proved successful in allowing the information technology systems of the main criminal justice agencies to communicate with each other. However, it is accepted that this communication is far from perfect, with problems persisting over the definition and interpretation of data.

At the time of inception it was decided to concentrate on exchanging, rather than sharing, information. An unintended outcome of this decision is that IT development in individual organisations has continued to be inwardly focused, thereby constraining performance across the entire criminal justice system.

However, there appears to be a growing realisation of new burdens and opportunities in such areas as child protection and public safety, which require the criminal justice system to react quickly to supply and share accurate information. Thus, the possibility of using the loop to share as well as exchange information is currently being explored.

In March 2006 the National Criminal Justice Board ( NCJB) agreed that a review of the ISCJIS programme should be undertaken. The remit of this review is to make recommendations to the Board on the future structure and strategy for integrating criminal justice information systems in Scotland. Essentially, how can ISCJIS contribute to the Scottish Executive strategy for integrating criminal justice information?

The stated aim of the review is to provide a system that can aid information sharing for Scottish law enforcement and justice agencies that:

• crosses organisational boundaries without impediment;
• where possible removes manual intervention from business processes;
• assigns appropriate responsibility for security, accuracy and timeliness.

It is commonly accepted that the most effective way to share information among criminal justice partners would be to store information on a central criminal database, giving specified permissions to each agency according to its lawful needs. Presently, no such commonly accessible database exists.

Nonetheless, the absence of such a system is no excuse for not improving data sharing between criminal justice partners.

The ISCJIS medium term strategy for improving data sharing would involve:

• common terminology with agreed data standards;
• improved data quality, with agencies assuming responsibility for own data;
• a strategy for statistics and management information which adopts common standards and definitions;
• an integrated strategy where new developments and change are discussed on an inter-agency basis;
• a strategy flexible enough to support new technology and policy areas, e.g. violence reduction, child protection, anti-social behaviour.

HMIC acknowledges current work by the ISCJIS review programme in this area, and agrees that every effort should be made to maximise existing opportunities to improve data sharing between criminal justice partners.

In light of the these developments, HMIC believes that there are clear advantages for the Scottish Children's Reporter Administration ( SCRA) being brought into the ISCJIS data exchange and sharing arena. Whilst accepting that there are issues involving electronic receipting and existing contracts, it is nonetheless disappointing that the potential benefits and efficiencies to all parties, which could be achieved by SCRA having direct access to ISCJIS, are not being realised.

Scenario

Every working day, across Scotland, the ISCJIS system allows the police to send reports about alleged adult offenders electronically to the relevant procurator fiscal, literally at the touch of a button. This is one of the many advances in efficiencies between the police and procurator fiscal service which allows more time and money to be spent on delivering frontline services.

Unfortunately, with one exception in Scotland the same process does not apply when reporting alleged juvenile offenders. Juvenile offender reports still have to be physically printed off and collated by police, then delivered daily to the relevant children's reporter. Without the luxury of an electronic process, this involves a very low-tech physical transfer, usually by means of at least one daily car journey per force and personal handover.

The Scottish Executive, SCRA and ACPOS all agree that better outcomes for children can be achieved by a swifter, more efficient hearing process.

4.12 Barriers to partnership working

HMIC accepts that whilst the concept of information sharing is straightforward, its practice is more complex. There are many hurdles that can obstruct information sharing between partner agencies. This inspection has confirmed that the challenges to greater information sharing are as follows:

• Organisational culture: The police service has historically had a culture of not sharing information, based on a perceived need for operational independence and confidentiality. Similarly, some areas of health organisations maintain a principled reluctance to share information on the grounds of protecting patient confidentiality, without further considering the need to protect potential victims (and thus, the argument goes, ensuring that patients are never too scared to seek healthcare/treatment for fear of information then being used against them). Though patient/client/victim confidentiality is clearly of huge importance, it cannot always be the most important consideration. There have been and will continue to be instances in the UK where professionals have, for very good, exceptional reasons, and after careful, objective risk assessment which takes account of all other available information, agreed to disclose sensitive personal information.
• Lack of training: There are times when though there is no objection in principle to sharing, practitioners of the information-holding organisation are nervous about what will happen if they do share, e.g. a doctor sharing information about underage sex. Perceptions surrounding interpretation of relevant legislation and misconceptions about how partner agencies will use the information need to be addressed.
• Lack of awareness: Information is not deliberately withheld, but is not shared because it is collated and stored within distinct silos. As a result individual organisations are unaware that the information they hold is or may be of value to anyone else. Solutions to this issue have to involve much wider understanding of the information types and systems used across the public sector.
• Information is shared and misunderstood: This occurs where information is shared but inconsistencies in language, thresholds and data standards prevent a mutual understanding across organisational boundaries. An example is the definition of 'serious risk' in child protection as a prerequisite for sharing information. The fact that this term unintentionally leads to different interpretations by each agency may prevent information being shared in perfectly appropriate circumstances. This is one of the reasons for the lesser criteria advocated in Recommendation 2A (page 22).

4.13 Risk Assessments

Risk assessments need to be considered when sharing intelligence and information because of the potential impact upon an individual user or customer, the public at large, an organisation or an employee of that organisation. Legislation including the Data Protection Act, discussed previously (page 15), places obligations on organisations when sharing information. However, these statutory obligations do NOT justify failing to share information that should have been shared. The events that led to the Bichard and Laming inquiries clearly demonstrate the risk of not sharing information.

Broadly speaking, therefore, there are two types of risk: the risk of sharing information and the risk of failing to share information. HMIC accepts that deciding whether or not to share information can be difficult. Nevertheless, the difficulty can be minimised through comprehensive training, as discussed in Chapter 6 (page 66) and an appreciation of both types of risk. The recommendations of the Bichard and Laming inquiries clearly intend to teach all public service providers that the risk of failing to share information must be considered in all sensitive decisions.

Additionally, there is the risk that organisations construct processes that flood systems with excessive information, increasing the likelihood of vital information being missed. The impact that increased information sharing may have upon partner agencies must be considered. In order to improve information sharing agencies must accept that it is a collaborative process developed across organisational boundaries to achieve collective goals. It is essential that all partner agencies are aware of the final product that the improved information sharing aims to deliver. Collective awareness of 'customer/user' need is necessary at each stage of the process, to build towards the final product. This requires each organisation to be conscious of the content and quality of information the recipient needs and how they will use this information.

Building this foundation of awareness will help to prevent problems that may arise elsewhere within individual organisations, whilst overcoming barriers to information sharing. For example, in July 2006, the Scottish Children's Reporter's Administration ( SCRA) reported a 10% rise in the numbers of children referred to them for offending or welfare concerns. Section 53 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 obliges the police to make such referrals and the increase had resulted from improved reporting arrangements for a number of reasons. Although acknowledging the requirement to share information, the negative publicity which resulted from reporting this increase highlighted the need to understand all of the implications of increased sharing. Opening the gateway to information sharing can lead to the system being swamped if there is no appreciation of the impact this may have upon the recipient organisation. This is not to say that the inability of one organisation to 'scale up' quickly to receive increased information should stop that information being shared. However, it does mean that dialogue should always take place before any anticipated increase in flow in order that possible solutions might be identified. It may be that, as in the SCRA example, there is a more appropriate destination for some of the information (implementation of recommendations 2A and 2B in this report would greatly ease this sense of single agency 'overload').

The SCRA situation also emphasises the marked difference between sharing and assessing information. Improving the general quality of information being shared requires a risk assessment to be undertaken by the practitioner providing the information (or at least by his/her organisation). The important element is managing the sharing aspect, and to achieve this it is essential that a quality assurance model is applied to the information being shared. There is clearly a need to develop a shared understanding of this process, through mutually agreed thresholds and criteria, that will give practitioners the confidence to make the decisions necessary to enhance the quality of information shared. This in turn will require the relevant practitioners responsible for managing the gateways of each organisation to undergo comprehensive training.

As previously discussed in this Chapter, a risk assessment is not a barrier to sharing information. It should be viewed as a tool that can enable practitioners to share information ethically and securely in the confidence that they will not incur personal or organisational liability.

To realise this, HMIC believe that it is good practice for information sharing protocols to incorporate a risk assessment model. For the majority of instances this will simply involve practitioners asking themselves two or three standard questions and very briefly recording the answers - the intention being to focus thoughts on the purpose of the act of information sharing.

4.14 Intelligence Grading System

Information to be considered for police intelligence purposes may first be recorded in a number of business processes, such as crime reports and custody records, before being extracted and assessed for intelligence purposes. Alternatively it can come directly from a source, confidential or otherwise. Across the UK the police service uses a standard pro-forma to record and assess all information to be considered for intelligence purposes, including specific intelligence extracted from these processes. This form (now computerised when used internally) assesses the reliability of the source of the information on a scale of A to E. The extent to which the information or intelligence itself is known to be accurate is assessed on a scale of 1 to 5, while later the level of protective measures required to handle it is analysed on another scale of 1 to 5. For this reason the form has become known as the 5x5x5.

The 5x5x5 is a tool which allows the police service to manage information that has risk attached to it. For example, the 5x5x5 can help to assess the risk of exposure of the source or of the use of the material. This assessment can in turn help to safeguard the operation and protect the source which the information relates to, thus maintaining police effectiveness. It is the standard format for managing the evaluation, the source and the provenance of the information, and the manner in which it should be handled and disseminated. The use of a 5x5x5 proforma sets off an audit trail which is integral to the NIM process, ensures consistency between forces, and so enables forces to share intelligence more easily. Managing the 5x5x5 recording and evaluation process requires effective intelligence management processes to be in place in accordance with the National Intelligence Model.

The 5x5x5 format facilitates the mechanics of sharing information. This format can be extended beyond policing to permit secure and ethical information sharing with other parties. HMIC believes that there is now a need for other agencies to adopt a similar model, to allow and indeed encourage professional, consistent information sharing across organisational boundaries. The following fictitious scenario shows how the same format could allow, for example, social work and health practitioners to share information.

Scenario

The Divisional Intelligence Unit of a police force has an arrangement with the local Royal Infirmary Hospital for transmitting intelligence. Most, but not all, of this intelligence emanates from the Accident and Emergency Department. Occasionally the information will be non-personal, for police use in planning patrol priorities - for example "three head wound cases in white male teenagers over last weekend at separate times from the vicinity of Cooper Street, some caused by blunt instrument - believed to be the result of gang-fighting". At other times specific intelligence relating to named people will be passed on when hospital staff believe that there is sufficient cause. The staff are assured that their intelligence will be treated in confidence because they have all received an awareness briefing jointly conducted by the head of A&E and the local detective inspector.

During one night shift at A&E our fictitious subject, a young man named Craig Mitchell Ramage, attends the hospital with a puncture wound to the abdomen. He is accompanied by a male friend whose name is not known. The injured party freely admits to the nurse and doctor attending him that he received the wound in a 'square go' (mutually agreed confrontation) with someone he refers to as Jimmy. Later the doctor overhears Ramage say to his companion that Jimmy Donaldson will have his house 'torched' next week for this. The doctor then passes this information to the police-trained single point of contact ( SPOC) within the hospital on that shift who submits the information that morning in an agreed format, via a secure communication system, to the police Divisional Intelligence Unit. An officer in that Unit then populates a 5x5x5 form with the intelligence and assesses it for dissemination.

After the information has been evaluated it is 'sanitised' to prevent those who will use it within the force knowing its origin. The following intelligence entry is placed on the Scottish Intelligence Database:

Feedback is passed confidentially to the SPOC at the hospital, who is authorised to share this with the originator of the information for the purpose of providing assurance about confidentiality and security.

A detective constable from a different division, in whose area both males live and who knows them personally from previous professional contact, is tasked with disrupting any fire-raising. Accompanied by a colleague, he visits Donaldson to warn him. Donaldson agrees to temporary CCTV being installed within his home and to he and his family leaving the home for a few days. CCTV is installed with a live link to a monitoring centre. When suspicious activity is observed one evening, the police are immediately alerted. They arrest Craig Mitchell Ramage in the garden of the house in possession of a home-made incendiary device. Ramage is later prosecuted and convicted, without any mention being made of the intelligence which initiated police action.

As a proven tool which allows the police service to share information confidently and effectively across business areas and forces, the 5x5x5 incorporates a uniform quality assurance model. By removing non-essential intelligence through analysis it helps to prevent the system being overloaded.

The scenario above demonstrates clearly how intelligence transfer between public service partners can be justified, confidential and involve minimal risk of compromise. However, this kind of intelligence transfer has yet to become established practice across the country.