Executive Summary
This report seeks to address The Scottish Fire and Rescue Services level of preparedness in the event of simultaneous terrorist attacks of a similar nature to those that occurred in London on 7 th. July 2005.
The report begins with a short review of four major incidents and seeks to highlight the learning outcomes from each. Scotland's level of preparedness is then judged against these learning outcomes.
The background to the London bombings is examined and an abridged version of the events on that day is provided. The success of the emergency services, especially London Fire Brigade, in dealing with these tragic events is acknowledged. The reasons for this success can be summarised as follows:-
- London Fire Brigade frontline staff are involved in the very best multi agency training available to tackle terrorist incidents.
- A large Brigade with sufficient Principal Officers for flexible and simultaneous deployment was a major success factor.
- The benefits of being a large Brigade allowed an almost straight forward step up of 'day to day' operations.
- In the Commissioner of London Fire Brigade's opinion, not having to cross boundaries into neighbouring Brigade areas saved time and was more effective.
- The Commissioner has stated that on the day London Fire Brigade Control Room was able to cope with the terrorist incident and 487 other emergency calls because of its regional size and capacity to cope and its integration with the London Resource Management Centre.
- The Brigade and the agencies it generally works with on emergency planning and civil contingencies issues are also structured on a regional basis under the London Regional Resilience Forum.
This report concludes:-
Significant work and investment is required in the infrastructure of the Service to ensure that Scotland's response to simultaneous terrorist attacks is equal to that of London Fire Brigade.
Failure or delays in addressing a number of vital areas will cause the operational 'front end' of Scotland's Fire and Rescue Services to be less effective and lead to a restricted performance. This will frustrate the best efforts of staff at the operational "front end" and potentially place them and the public at greater risk
There is an unequivocal confidence in the operational 'front end' of the Scottish Fire and Rescue Services to deliver a quality response no matter the size and scale of the situations they may have to face. However, there is less confidence evident when viewing some of the critical areas surrounding support services and infrastructure. A number of common areas are identified as being vulnerable.
These areas are:-
Radio communications
This is recognised as a weak area when considering the response of Scottish Fire and Rescue Services to coordinated terrorist attacks. There is a need to urgently address the issues surrounding radio communications, particularly the need to secure interoperability at the appropriate level across the emergency services. This will require decisive political and professional leadership at the highest level.
Fire Control Rooms
The London experience demonstrates that a regional sized control room, the size envisaged by the Mott McDonald report on Fire Control Rooms for Scotland, is best able to cope with the command issues stemming from a coordinated simultaneous terrorist attack. Control Rooms must be integrated and provide adequate capacity and resilience for Scotland. The option of three Fire Control Rooms would meet these vital requirements.
Therefore, there is a need for decisive political and professional leadership at the highest level to determine the future of Fire Control Rooms in Scotland.
Organisational and Geographical Boundaries
A reduction in the number of organisational and geographical boundaries currently in place would shorten communication lines and reduce the tiers of decision making across those boundaries. Whilst the entire Fire and Rescue Services attempt to work to a common aim, i.e. dealing with emergencies, disasters and civil contingencies, it is not always easy or effective when working with eight different organisations and a plethora of other agencies. A single Fire and Rescue Service for Scotland, which would still allow for local accountability and identity, operating at a strategic level, where incident command and service support and infrastructure could be set to a single standard rather than have to cross protocols and procedures of differing boundaries, would achieve these aims. Service boundaries mean different equipment and appliances within those boundaries. A single Fire and Rescue Service would result in the standardising of both equipment and procedures.
Multi Agency Training
The Scottish Emergency Coordination Committee needs to do even more to drive Scottish-wide multi agency training exercises. Realistically, this will incur costs. However, this investment needs to be made if Scottish preparedness is to equal that displayed during the London incidents.
Resilience
Whilst mindful of the necessity to remain interoperable and integrated with the remainder of the UK, Scotland deserves a greater degree of resilience within its own borders.
This aim is in harmony with both the First Ministers vision for Scotland and the Permanent Secretary's "Characteristics for Scottish Society" which includes, "We stand, as far as possible, on our own feet".
Consequential Risks
Failure or delays in addressing these vulnerable areas in the infrastructure of the Fire and Rescue Services in Scotland will cause the operational "front end" of the Service to be less effective despite their best efforts. This will ultimately lead to the public being placed at greater risk and staff, in particular Control Room staff, who provide the vital support to the 'front end', will be placed under enormous stress.
In addition to this, those responsible for the effectiveness and leadership of the Service, both political and professional, who are aware of these vulnerable areas, will be heavily criticised when simultaneous terrorist attacks occur.
The report makes four recommendations:-
1. A radio scheme capable of emergency services interoperability must be secured for Scotland's Fire and Rescue Services without delay.
2. In order to achieve integration and resilience of Fire Control Rooms for Scotland, three regional sized Control Rooms should replace the current eight smaller existing facilities and should be secured without delay.
3. In order to shorten communication lines and reduce the tiers of decision making across current boundaries, a review of the number of Fire and Rescue Services should be undertaken with the aim of introducing a single, strategic level Fire and Rescue Service for Scotland whilst still achieving local accountability, identity and service delivery.
4. Through the auspices of the Scottish Emergency Coordinating Committee, the number of Scottish-wide multi agency exercises designed around simulated terrorist attacks of a simultaneous nature should be increased.
Note
Addressing these recommendations will provide Scotland with an appropriate level of resilience whilst remaining part of the wider UK provision.