Scottish Government

Operations involving the Deer Commission for Scotland in Glenfeshie and Strathglass

Appendix B
Glenfeshie / Strathglass: SGA Allegations and questions requiring DCS response with DCS responses

NB: The responses given in Appendix B are entirely the responsibility of DCS and it should be understood these are neither the opinions of, nor necessarily shared by, ERAD officials or Ministers

Strathglass

• The operations will have a serious impact in the area and on individuals. The Community Council was given 24 hours notice. Why was there no proper consultation with the Community Council and no reasonable forewarning?

DCS recognising the complexity of the problem and the potential for misinformation elected to contact the Community Council to inform them, first hand, of the issue and the solutions being discussed with regard to addressing the damage to grassland. When the CC were contacted DCS had already agreed with the affected land owner that trials for the capture and subsequent killing of deer could be carried out on her land. DCS move to inform the CC was out of courtesy rather than consultation.

DCS organised a meeting of the estates from which the deer causing the problem were understood to be coming from on the 26 ^th Feb. During this meeting we mentioned our intention to raise the issue at the next Community Council meeting. DCS contacted the secretary of the Community Council on the afternoon of the 8 ^th March and briefly discussed the issue of damage to an agricultural interest.

The secretary explained that the agenda for the evening was full due to the ongoing discussion within the community regarding Pylon Lines and suggested that it could be raised under AOB.

DCS offered to come and speak to the CC at a convenient date and were invited to attend a meeting, scheduled for 22 ^nd March to discuss the issues.

So the chronology was:

26 February: meeting of affected parties: agreed to keep Community Council informed;

8 March: Community Council informed of issues to date ahead of its meeting that evening - at that stage interested parties had not reached any agreement;

22 March: DCS attend meeting of Community Council.

It is important to distinguish between consultation and provision of accurate information. DCS consulted with directly affected interests (neighbouring estates and the Deer Management Group), and sought to keep the Community Council informed of what was happening.

• It was agreed on 22 March that the CC would be invited to all future meetings. Why did a meeting take place on the following day without this happening?

The meeting was called by one of the land occupiers who specifically did not wish to invite a Community Council representative. DCS were invited by the farmer. Following this meeting DCS wrote to the CC to keep them informed of progress. The CC had receipt of this letter prior to writing to RF. (copy enclosed?)

• The farmer made formal representations on 23 February; why were pens being marked out before this?

As mentioned above the pens were being erected to conduct an agreed research/demonstration project, with the agreement of the farmer. DCS have been looking to trial live capture as part of the process of developing Best Practice in to this topic, given that live capture is legal and is used. Funding for the construction of the pens had been included in DCS' 2003/04 budget. DCS had previously identified a site in Sutherland to carry out the trial. This did not go ahead and another suitable situation was identified in Strathglass where:

There has been local concern regarding the use of this method and as a result the trials at this location have been delayed to allow more time to provide accurate briefing on what is proposed.

If capture for culling is not used in this situation DCS will continue to identify other opportunities where it can be trialled. The capture for culling guide will not be published until a trial is undertaken. The development of BP in this area is becoming controversial on emotive, rather than welfare, grounds.

• Some neighbouring landowners were not consulted

The farmer had written to the neighbouring landowners/occupiers from whose land the deer causing the problem were coming from on the 15 ^th Dec and 1 ^st week in Jan. Only 2 had taken the trouble to reply, one suggesting that DCS should be contacted to address the problem and the other offering to repair a short stretch of fence. The repair of this fence would not have solved the problem. The lack of response from her neighbours and the absence of an effective solution led the farmer to contact DCS.

• Why is DCS refusing to deal with the issue by shooting when night shooting is going on? There is an inconsistency of approach.

Night shooting authorisation applies only to specific parts of the land in question, where DCS inspection has ascertained that shooting can be carried out safely. However, to control the numbers of deer which enter the land in the Summer, shooting would need to be undertaken on all parts of the land , and this would lead to unacceptable public safety risks.

• What process does DCS use to judge whether people are fit and competent for authorisations?

Currently fit and competence is judged by the possession of a valid firearms certificate and information that applicants supply on authorisation application forms regarding their experience (i.e. numbers of years as a stalker) and qualifications (possession of DSC level 1/2) or training.

Proposals going to the DCS Deer Management Committee on the 6th of May 2004 for approval are to:

A) Ask applicants to supply two signed statements from referees (not employers) stating that the referee is satisfied that the applicant is:

• Known to the referee for 5 years;
• Able to discharge a weapon with due regard to public safety;
• Able to kill a deer without causing unnecessary suffering;
• Able to follow Best Practice guidance.

The application form would state that the referees may be subject to spot checking by DCS at any time.

B) Explore mechanisms for assessing applicant's 'fit and competence' by DCS staff during site visits. Applicants could be asked to bring their firearm with staff assessing their knowledge of Best Practice and observing their firearm handling and safety, including scenario testing. Questions would come from an agreed DCS list to be developed by the Best Practice Steering Group. Once satisfied, DCS could place the controller on a register of 'fit and competent controllers' which would be valid for three years, meaning repeat applications by the same nominated controller need not supply references or require a DCS assessment.

• How could Best Practice have been followed at Strathglass? No Best Practice exists for live capture.

DCS has not claimed that Best Practice is being followed for the pens in Strathglass: they are in fact part of the process to help develop thinking on Best Practice. However, the trial design is based on an extensive review of live capture pens that have been used in the past throughout Scotland. Both the pens and procedure to be used is based on DCS' assessment of the best aspects of past practice.

Glenfeshie

Public Safety

• Were any dangerous shots fired during the collaborative cull?
  • The herd was encircled and shots were fired inwards. This is dangerous practice.

Any discharge of firearms is a potentially dangerous action, and therefore all safety issues need to be considered very carefully. Neither DCS nor any of the individual, professional stalkers engaged in the Glenfeshie culls (whether under Section 10 or subsequently) would have taken part in an operation which they considered dangerous. The deployment of rifles took into account topography, deer distribution and movement, the continuous use of radios, communication with the helicopters and the known experience of all the stalkers. In these circumstances, the deployment of stalkers was considered to be responsible and effective.

• Safety questions over hill walker walking into area:
  • Did all riflemen know location of the hill walker and how was this confirmed?
  • Was any public advance warning given of the operation?

All walkers were monitored as they came near the area of operation. Radios were used to inform all rifles of the presence, location and movement of walkers. Those rifles who were likely to be affected by a walker's presence acknowledged the information.

There was no advance warning of the operation - the need for rapid use of Section 10 precluded this. There is no assumption that estates will issue such advance warning about culling operations. The responsibility for ensuring that public safety is not compromised must always rest squarely with those undertaking a cull, and it would be wrong ever to assume that because an advanced warning had been issued there would be no walkers in the area.

Deer welfare

• Driving of deer by helicopter
  • Was the helicopter used to drive deer, for example to push deer from Mar Lodge to Glenfeshie to be shot? Or from Glenfeshie to Mar Lodge to be shot?
  • Were the deer moved from Mar Lodge onto Glenfeshie then counted?
  • If so, where does the Deer Act empower the DCS to do so?

The helicopter was never used to drive deer to rifles. Rifles were deployed around deer and the helicopter was positioned to block exit routes. The helicopter was not used to push deer from Mar Lodge to Glenfeshie or the other way around for the purposes of either counting or shooting.

(In fact legal advice is that the use of helicopters to drive deer would not be illegal under the terms of Sections 14 and 41 of the Deer (Scotland) Act 1996).

• The deer were effectively held captive with no means of escape for a period of over 1 ¹/ ₂ hours. This led to unacceptable levels of stress.
  • What was the maximum length of time any group of deer were pursued?

Deer were never held 'captive' although depending on topography and number of rifles deployed the time that any group remained within range of rifles is unlikely to have exceeded 30 min. The time that any single rifle was firing at deer is unlikely to have exceeded 5 min. The behaviour of the deer was monitored at all times (looking for generally accepted signs of stress) to ensure that levels of stress were never unacceptable.

• Wounded animals were not despatched quickly enough. For example, on the day of the filming the animal which was hit by the first or second shot was not finished off until the 10 ^th.
  • What was the longest period of time between an animal being shot and its death?
  • Did anyone, at anytime, shoot deer from the helicopter?

Best Practice Guidance suggests that all animals should die within 5 minutes of being shot. Whilst this target was achieved for the vast majority of animals shot during the Glenfeshie operation, as is sadly unavoidable in any stalking activity, there were isolated incidents when it was not achieved. The longest time between an animal being shot and dying is believed to have been 15 minutes. So far as DCS is aware, only 2 animals exceeded the 5 minute guideline before being killed. Dispatching wounded animals was always the priority of the team and tight communication ensured that these animals were effectively targeted by the most appropriately positioned rifle.

No shots were fired from the helicopter, and no rifle was ever loaded while on the helicopter.

• It is unacceptable to conduct lengthy pursuits of heavily pregnant hinds.

The deer were not pursued for lengthy periods and care was taken to ensure that they were not subjected to unacceptable levels of stress.

Food hygiene

• Deer were not gralloched on hill. They had clearly been dead for several hours before bleeding and gralloching took place.

On the last four days of operation (17, 18, 29 and 30 March), Glenfeshie estate specifically decided that some deer should not be gralloched on the hill, because they had concerns about the effects an accumulation of gralloch would have on their grouse interests, which is a key generator of income and jobs on the estate. The estate wished to avoid an influx of scavengers such as ravens, given that a considerable number had been observed feeding on grallochs following a previous cull.

The gralloching operation on these four days was a significant deviation from the practice followed from 29 January until 16 March.

• Did any additional contamination occur in the field where the gralloching took place? Evidence that it did included:
  • Previous animal waste on ground from extensive gralloching over previous days. Similarly, horse dung in the area concerned.
  • Vehicle not cleaned at all following use for plucks and back passages from animals on previous day
  • Knives sticking in ground. No gloves or water. Refueller was also dragging deer; aviation fuel contamination.

Whilst DCS supported and advised on the cull, the processing of carcasses was co-ordinated by the estate. DCS explained in detail to the estate that the estate's plans for 17, 18, 29 and 30 March deviated from best practice, but the estate insisted that the gralloching be conducted differently. As noted below, all carcasses were inspected before entering the food chain in the same way as for any other cull.

• Did venison go to the food chain? If so was it quality assured?

All venison (with the exception of 9 carcasses which were condemned) went to licensed venison dealers. All carcasses were subject to inspection in the larder, and final inspection at the venison dealer's premises. The procedure was no different from normal. The carcasses were processed in the FCS larder and sold by Glenfeshie estate which is not part of the QA system.

• If any of these points were the responsibility of the estate, what did DCS do to ensure the observance of best practice? Why did they allow the operation to continue?

DSC advised the estate about the existing Best Practice for venison production and pointed out where this was not being adhered to. As noted above, DCS explained in detail to the estate that the estate's plans for 17, 18, 29 and 30 March deviated from best practice, but the estate insisted that the gralloching on those four days be conducted differently. DCS' primary concern was to ensure that the cull was conducted safely, humanely and effectively. The purpose of Best Practice Guidance is to provide advice on what is considered best practice, to allow practitioners to feel that if they follow best practice they are on safe ground, and to provide support to those seeking vocational qualifications. Best Practice is not intended to provide formal qualifications, to be used as codes written into legislation (except those directly related to provisions in the Deer (Scotland) Act 1996). Nor is it intended that the Best Practice Steering Group should audit the use of Best Practice or endorse others to do so.

General

• Were the methods used during and after the cull approved by the Chairman and other Board members and were they happy with the standards applied?

The operations at Glenfeshie and DCS involvement in Strathglass are consistent with the Deer (Scotland) Act 1996 and with DCS' Vision Statement and Long Term Strategy, which are endorsed both by the DCS Board and by Scottish Ministers. The Feshie catchment is a well-established DCS Priority Site. The principles of DCS' use of Section 10 and Section 12, and the conduct of operations guided by Best Practice, were approved by the Chairman and Board of DCS. Day to day operations were supervised by the Technical Director, with approval of overall specific operations and expenditure by the Director. The Chairman was kept up to date on a very regular basis, and Members received updates by email. Only the culling on 29 and 30 January were conducted by the DCS with the co-operation of the estate; thereafter relatively routine culling operations were conducted by the estate, as is its right and responsibility, with DCS providing advice and support at the estate's request. This is entirely in line with DCS' published policies on supporting collaborative deer management.

• On the basis of whose advice did the DCS conclude that serious damage was occurring?

The operations in Glenfeshie were rooted in the agreed targets in the Section 7 Control Agreement, which includes targets for regeneration, a target initial total population, and a requirement to take action to prevent serious damage. The Section 10 action on 29/30 January 2004 was triggered by a DCS census which showed that a major congregation of deer had occurred in a sensitive area identified in the Section 7 agreement - over 90 deer per km ². Given the sudden and major increase in deer density and the known status of the area, DCS technical staff concluded that serious damage was bound to occur very quickly. Serious damage in this case would be the browsing of last year's incremental growth on the existing tree seedlings in the area. The culling operations which Glenfeshie estate undertook after 30 January were designed to catch up on cull targets aimed at achieving the agreed target deer population to deliver habitat targets, further informed by a census on 1-2 March.

• DCS has not been open, transparent or co-operative

The initiation of the Section 10 operation was by its nature an emergency, and this constrained DCS' opportunities immediately to conduct widespread communications. However, DCS made and continues to make considerable efforts to communicate the facts and the reasons behind the operations in Glenfeshie. This includes:

The possible use of Section 10 was raised explicitly with the Section 7 group in August 2003 and again at subsequent Section 7 liaison group meetings. The estate was aware from the August meeting that it would need to have a contingency plan in place to deal with sudden incursions of deer.

DCS have attempted to make all the facts known. Only the total numbers of deer culled from 31 January onward were not publicly released until the estate had given permission, since DCS are bound to respect commercial confidentiality of third parties.

DCS would have responded immediately to any questions or allegations had they been raised directly with DCS.