The Ability of Public Transport to Cope withTarget Passenger Increases: Final Report

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The Ability of Public Transport to Cope withTarget Passenger Increases: Final Report

9. THE VIEW OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR STAKEHOLDERS

9.1 Introduction

9.1.1 In this chapter, the key issues raised in the discussions with the public transport companies are presented. First, the bus operator discussions are summarised. This is then followed by the key issues raised by those involved in the rail industry.

9.2 The Bus Industry

9.2.1 As outlined in Chapter 3, interviews were conducted with the following bus operators:

  • First Glasgow which operates services in the Greater Glasgow area
  • First East Scotland which operates throughout the Lothians and Borders, in the Falkirk and Stirling areas and in the city of Aberdeen
  • Lothian Buses which operates in Edinburgh, Midlothian and parts of East Lothian
  • Scottish Citylink which operates long distance express coach services
  • Stagecoach Scotland which operates predominantly in Ayrshire, Dumfries and Galloway, Fife, Perth, Aberdeenshire and the Inverness area
  • Strathtay Scottish which operates predominantly in Perth and Kinross and in Angus
  • Travel Dundee which operates services in the city of Dundee

9.2.2 This section sets out results of the discussions with bus operators and is grouped under the following main issues:

  • Recent trends in patronage
  • The relationship between existing capacity provision and utilisation
  • Expected changes in capacity provision
  • Response to targets

Recent Trends in Patronage

9.2.3 There have been some interesting developments in recent years which have appeared to have arrested the long term decline in bus patronage at least in certain areas. This has been most notable in Edinburgh where there has been considerable growth as a result of increased economic prosperity and growth in the employment market. Car restraint measures and the Greenways bus priorities scheme have also encouraged greater usage of bus transport. In Glasgow growth has emerged in 2001 and 2002. This growth was attributed to the launch of various initiatives by the operators including the Overground network. The other two main cities are still experiencing decline due to population decline and the decline of traditional industries.

9.2.4 The other area of growth has been the expansion by some operators of their network of express services. Scottish Citylink has strengthened its main network of express services between Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen. Stagecoach has introduced an extensive network of express services connecting Ayr and Fife to nearby cities. Also successful have been certain park and ride schemes most notably Ferrytoll at North Queensferry and on a smaller scale at Ellon in Aberdeenshire.

9.2.5 In rural areas decline is still the main feature but there has been some growth in certain towns such as Paisley, Perth and Montrose. Operators acknowledge that the new concessionary fare scheme has resulted in growth of concessionary travel by about 20-30% and 10-15% overall.

Existing Capacity Provision and Utilisation

9.2.6 Edinburgh and Glasgow experience the greatest pressure on peak period capacity. The morning peak is greater and more concentrated between 0800 and 0900 whereas the evening peak is more spread out. Also the evening peak can vary on different days of the week as passengers take advantage of late opening of shops on Thursdays and an early finish from work on Fridays. There is also a seasonal variation with the months of October to December representing the greatest overall peak. This coincides with the maximum attendance at schools and colleges, the minimum incidence of annual holidays from work and also the build up of pre-Christmas shopping. Despite the introduction of low floor single deck vehicles with greater standing capacity, operators consider that a full seated load represents full capacity although standing passengers are tolerated over short distances of up to _ kilometre. The main operators in Edinburgh and Glasgow consider that sufficient capacity is provided to meet peak period demand provided that each peak period is considered as an entity. It is acknowledged that there is a regular incidence of passengers unable to board the first bus which appears particularly on corridors on the south side of both cities. This is more likely to occur as a result of traffic congestion rather than shortage of capacity.

9.2.7 Operators in the other main cities acknowledge that, due to continued decline in patronage, there is spare capacity at peak periods. Indeed because the decline of peak period travel is greater than off-peak there is less disparity between the two periods. Overcrowding can nevertheless occur because of the effect of traffic congestion. An example of this exists on routes which cross the Kingsway ring road to and from Dundee city centre. Lengthy queues can form at roundabouts where radial routes intersect with the ring road.

9.2.8 Outside the main cities there is not generally speaking a problem of peak period capacity. Seasonal peaks may vary with summer providing the greatest overall peak compared with the autumn months in the cities. Demand can vary markedly between different days as day-trippers take advantage of fine weather. On Citylink services, there is also a weekend peak of demand on Friday and Sunday afternoons.

9.2.9 All operators proactively monitor passenger demand and capacity. This is done in a variety of ways. First Glasgow undertakes a regular analysis of ticket machine data, Lothian Buses uses its roving inspectors and Stagecoach has a number of Traffic Monitors who carry out a rolling programme of checking individual journeys both to monitor passenger loadings and reliability of operation. Other operators make regular use of reports by drivers and observations by management.

Changes in Capacity Provision

9.2.10 Fleet sizes have increased in certain areas as a result of increased demand. First Glasgow has increased by 8%, Lothian Buses by about 5% and Stagecoach by 15%. Some operators have also benefited from additional vehicles provided under the additional costs provision of the new concessionary fares system. All the main operators have been able to increase their fleet utilisation substantially. This has been achieved in a number of ways:

  • a reduction in directly competitive services
  • a reduction in subsidised services which are now being operated increasingly by smaller independent operators
  • a reduction in the disparity between peak and off-peak services
  • improved scheduling and the removal of restrictive practices
  • increased provision of services at night and on Sundays.

9.2.11Scottish Citylink has also been able to increase vehicle utilisation by adding additional peak journeys between Edinburgh and Glasgow before or after other contracted journeys.

9.2.12 Operators have responded to changes in demand by also changing the composition of the fleet. The trend has been towards low floor single deck vehicles. First Glasgow, however, have decided to replace some of these with mid-life double deckers to provide more capacity. In addition they have been experimenting with large capacity double deckers which provide up to 110 seats. Ten such vehicles have been acquired for evaluation and so far the results have been encouraging with no apparent increase in boarding times. Lothian Buses are also considering the use of higher capacity double deckers and articulated buses are in operation with Stagecoach and First Aberdeen. First Group is attempting to more closely match vehicle capacity with demand on individual journeys through its "bus to board" system which identifies the vehicle capacity required on each running board. This can mean that different vehicle types can be scheduled on different journeys on the same route. This flexibility on the part of operators has been facilitated by the fact that most of them are part of nationwide groupings which enables vehicles to be transferred between operating companies to meet local needs.

9.2.13 Both First Glasgow and Lothian Buses are experiencing some difficulty in recruiting and retaining drivers. This is not considered to be because of inadequate rates of pay. The problem is about retention rather than recruitment with staff turnover of the order of 20-30% per year. This stems from the unattractiveness of shift working, concerns over personal safety because of assaults on drivers and the frustration of coping with ever increasing traffic congestion which can lead to uncertainty as to when drivers are going to be able to complete their shifts. First Glasgow has experimented with better rates for new starts and providing opportunities for longer shifts with enhanced earning opportunities. Both operators feel that the seniority system whereby drivers pick their shifts in order of seniority also leads to problems of retention because newer drivers are left with unpopular shifts. Other operators expressed no difficulty over staffing except Stagecoach in the Dunfermline area paradoxically because of the attractive wage rates available at Lothian Buses. Despite these difficulties they are not sufficiently great to threaten reliability of services at present.

9.2.14 None of the operators interviewed expressed any difficulty over recruitment of other types of staff such as maintenance and clerical. Strathtay has decided to continue with conductor operation on the coastal corridor between Dundee and Arbroath. This was introduced as a competitive strategy but has been found to be beneficial on these relatively lengthy but high turnover routes. Despite lower wage rates for conductors and crew drivers, the company experiences no difficulty in recruiting sufficient staff.

9.2.15 All operators interviewed are proactive in looking for new growth opportunities and do not consider capacity restraints to be any hindrance. Any increase in service provision does have to pass the financial test. At Lothian Buses this depends on overall route financial performance rather than an incremental cost and revenue assessment. Scottish Citylink does not experience any difficulty in obtaining sufficient vehicles even to meet peak summer demand provided that vehicles are contracted sufficiently far in advance. Although the company has succeeded in improving peak frequencies on the Edinburgh to Glasgow service through improved utilisation of vehicles, any further increase in daily peak requirement could be obtained from coach operators but the additional revenue would not be enough to cover the cost of resources which would utilised only for short periods at peak times.

Response to Targets

9.2.16 None of the operators interviewed has had any direct involvement in the setting of targets for increased use of public transport. Nor has there been any discussion regarding how such targets might be met. There have been discussions with local authorities but these are mainly about specific schemes which in many cases form part of the authority's bid for funding from the Public Transport Fund. Operators are generally enthusiastic about such schemes and are usually willing to make a financial contribution towards their success. The schemes, however, are mostly initiated by the local authorities rather than by the operators.

9.2.17 Nearly all operators interviewed considered that further bus priority measures were necessary if a modal shift towards bus transport is to be achieved. Such measures need to improve the flow of buses through junctions as well as provide bus lanes along radial routes. One operator suggested that highway authorities should work towards an ideal whereby the only reason why buses should stop would be to allow passengers to board or alight. Greater bus priorities would have the following benefits:

  • improved journey times for passengers
  • improved reliability of services avoiding the effect of bunching
  • reduced staff turnover because of reduced stress and frustration felt by drivers coping with traffic congestion
  • greater comfort and less stress for passengers
  • better utilisation of resources which would allow a higher level of service to be provided from the same resource input

9.2.18 The second major priority was felt to be improvements to the roadside environment including better shelters and information provision. In some town centres there was even a basic lack of kerb space to cater for the numbers of buses required to stop. Some operators suggested that public support could be directed to particular groups of passengers such as the unemployed. Stagecoach has put forward a proposal called "kickstart" which would involve improvements to certain services. These would be publicly funded to begin with but ultimately they would be self financing as passenger levels build up. Although operators could do this on a commercial basis, public funding would allow more such schemes to take place. The company has experimented with one such scheme in Perth as part of their contribution to a quality partnership with the local authority. The results appear to be successful.

9.2.19 None of the operators interviewed considered that the targets which have been set were in any way unrealistic in terms of supply constraints. In terms of percentage growth of patronage, the new concessionary fares scheme itself is likely to enable many of the targets to be met. However, if a greater level of modal shift is to be achieved, there would need to be measures to stimulate demand as well as the additional resources to meet the demand.

Summary of Key Findings From Bus Company Interviews

9.2.20 The following are the key findings from the analysis of the bus company interviews:

  • there is evidence that the long term decline in bus patronage has been turned around in some areas. This is particularly evident in Glasgow and Edinburgh and on the high frequency express services operated by Scottish Citylink and some of the other bus operators.
  • generally speaking there is sufficient capacity currently available to meet peak period demand in all places and spare capacity is generally available outside the two main cities of Glasgow and Edinburgh. Any incidents of overcrowding and/or passengers left behind are usually because of bunching caused by traffic congestion and not a shortage of capacity across the full peak period.
  • operators actively attempt to match vehicle capacity with demand on individual journeys by converting single decker routes to double decker ones or by using higher capacity vehicles when necessary. Most operators are part of national groups and have the ability to transfer vehicles between group subsidiaries to ensure adequate capacity.
  • operators have been able to cope so far with the upsurge in demand brought about by the national concessionary fares scheme. This in itself may enable companies to meet some of target increases in bus travel.
  • the biggest constraint on the ability of bus operators to further increase capacity is the ability to recruit and, more particularly, retain sufficient bus drivers. This problem is most acute in Glasgow and Edinburgh. The problem is not that bus drivers are inadequately paid, it is more about the difficulties in dealing with an element of anti-social passengers, the stress of coping with long periods of traffic congestion and the associated uncertainties over shift finish times.
  • bus operators have had no active involvement in setting targets for increased bus usage nor any detailed discussions about how such targets might be achieved.
  • operators are normally greatly encouraged by schemes which are promoted by local authorities to improve bus transport and are often prepared to make financial contributions. Such schemes, however, are usually initiated by the authorities and operators are consulted about the details but not necessarily the principles.
  • bus operators would like to see more bus priority measures, perhaps with greater emphasis on priorities at signals and junctions. Bus priority measures improve journey times for passengers, provide greater reliability of services, less stress for drivers and allow more productive use of a fixed set of resources. There is also a benefit in vehicle location to give real time information and better fleet management.

9.3 The Rail Industry

9.3.1 The representatives of the Scottish rail industry (i.e. Network Rail, ScotRail and SPT) were broadly consistent in their views on rail capacity and the ability to cope with patronage targets. The generally agreed points are covered first, followed by the variety of individual issues raised. However, in some instances commercially sensitive comments were made and, where appropriate, these have been converted from company-specific examples to generalisations.

9.3.2 The number of trains operated has increased substantially since privatisation, though with few improvements to line capacity other than a number of signalling improvements that have enabled shorter headways. The increased number of train movements has been accommodated by the use of extra paths through a largely unmodified network. The major example is Edinburgh Waverley, which has seen an increase of approximately 50% in the number of timetabled trains operating through a local network which is almost unaltered since the days of British Railways, apart from some additional signals in the Haymarket area which allow trains to approach the station more closely when the platform is still occupied by the previous train.

9.3.3 It is generally agreed that the number of train services operating in the peak in the Central Belt is now at its maximum, but it is also accepted that this does not necessarily imply that the system cannot cope with more demand. Increasing capacity at peak times, by whatever means, is seen to be an expensive option, attracting increased patronage at times of highest marginal cost. For example, forming longer trains and building longer platforms to cater for them would be to invest money showing returns for very limited times of the day. For most of the time, such investments would be under-used and would therefore show poor value for money. The Glasgow Underground is used later in the report as a demonstration of this principle, although there may be sound wider economic, political or social reasons for investing in increased peak capacity.

9.3.4 The generally agreed best strategy is to encourage the use of the spare capacity available on the shoulders of the peak and off-peak. At these times, unused seats may be filled, trains may be lengthened from a short, off-peak formation to peak hour length and frequencies enhanced from off-peak to peak levels. This effectively requires policies to spread demand, thus allowing patronage growth from the existing infrastructure and rolling stock. This leads back to the issue of what is meant by 'capacity': if it is the ability to carry passengers in the peak-of-the-peak then capacity has, in general, been reached in the major city centre stations. If, however, 'capacity' is defined as the number of passengers who may be carried per day, then the system has an ability to carry substantially more passengers and more passenger-kilometres than it does at present. To some extent this is being achieved by the changing nature of travel demands. There is more employment in suburban and peripheral areas, more white-collar jobs and more flexi-working. All this is spreading the journey-to-work, both temporally and geographically. Furthermore, journey lengths are extending and the proportion of non-work journeys is rising, both giving increases in the numbers and in the lengths of journeys without necessarily increasing the peak hour throughput at the major city centre stations.

9.3.5 Although there was some scepticism about the wisdom of investing considerable sums of money to enhance peak capacity, the argument was tempered by another, counter-acting argument. It was agreed by all parties that delivered capacity, the train- and seat-kilometres actually provided, varied from day-to-day due to service cancellations, equipment failures and a range of other perturbations. The nearer the system was pushed to its ultimate, theoretical capacity the more vulnerable it was to considerable degradation by these events, even though some of them in themselves might be quite minor. There was therefore a strong suggestion that some extra capacity was needed, not to provide more paths or more seats, but to protect services from the effects of inevitable operational problems. For example, the Edinburgh to Glasgow shuttle has such short turnround times that it is difficult to recover from delays initially caused by a wide variety of uncontrollable events such as trespassers on the line. The timetabled service shows high utilisation of stock and platform capacities but, in practice, the timetable is made the more fragile by the small margins of flexibility.

9.3.6 This is the key point agreed by all interviewees. An improved image of public transport and consequent increases in its use are closely related to punctuality - a system operating at the limits of its capacity is at inherent risk of punctuality problems. This is to suggest that there should be some under-used capacity to act as an insurance against the unpredictable events that interrupt or delay services. The corollary is that measures of efficiency should not result in the maximum possible utilisation of infrastructure and rolling stock. The implication of this is that some spare stock should be provided to cover for failures or to lengthen layover times. It also suggests that some disinvestments in the infrastructure which were designed to cut maintenance costs could be restored. A good example is the ladder junctions between Waverley and Haymarket which enable trains to switch from any one of four tracks to any other. These are intensively used and for some movements there is no other alternative. Consequently, if trains run out of sequence, the effects may have repercussions for an increasing number of trains. If an alternative set of crossings were to be provided to the west of Haymarket station, some movements could be transferred there, distributing the conflicting movements and reducing the interactions between them. Strictly speaking, this second set of crossings is not really necessary: the existing infrastructure is theoretically capable of meeting the demands made upon it. The additional capital and maintenance costs are therefore not fully justified if judged against the criterion of improving capacity. However, if judged against the reductions in the risk of knock-on delays to services, they might well be justified. The same principle has another effect. By building in a degree of redundancy into the system, parts of it may be taken out of service for repair and maintenance without disrupting services. This goes some way to ensuring that maintenance and renewal does not have effects upon service levels and that the probability of unforeseen effects due to equipment failure is reduced. Of course this applies to both rolling stock and to infrastructure: both are covered in later sections.

Network Rail

9.37 Network Rail was particularly concerned with making the railway less susceptible to severe disruption and, in particular, to minimise the impacts of unplanned disturbances: essentially, to make the railway more robust. Space and time was needed in the first place to conduct routine maintenance, particularly lengthening the windows of time during which it could have access to the track. Complete unimpaired access could only be provided by cutting the hours of operation and difficulties in doing this were recognised. The Sleeper and night freight services made overnight blockades very problematic, particularly along the well used and vulnerable lines. There was a suggestion that some local and suburban services could be curtailed in the evenings and at weekends as a way of extending the periods in which uninterrupted maintenance might take place. For these slower and shorter journeys, bus substitution could be an acceptable alternative. Another option might be to install more crossovers and bi-directional signalling to enable single line working during off-peak periods to produce longer maintenance periods without resorting to short-term blockades. A third option would be to invest in higher-cost equipment such as over-specified point work or duplicated electrical equipment to reduce the risk of in-service failure.

9.3.8 All these techniques require either more money or the acceptance of lower rates of return on investment. It was thought that the rule-of-thumb used by the railway industry to estimate practical line capacity by cutting the theoretical maximum by 20% is too crude a measure. It is crude in two senses: first the difference between a theoretical and a consistently deliverable capacity varies from line to line and, second, from time to time. On some lines, particularly on the approaches to terminals where there are complex conflicting movements and the risk of interactive delays, the 20% rule produces an estimated capacity with insufficient margin to cope with all but the minor perturbations to the timetable. Station dwell times and turnround times may make demands upon platform capacity which prevent the full deployment of the capacity of the lines that feed them. This is particularly true where variations in dwell times leave the attempted timetable with too little spare capacity to be able to cope with perturbed running. Where the track and infrastructure allow for flexible routing, particularly with bi-directional running, the transfer of capacity from one track to another means that the margin of difference between theoretical and attainable capacity may be reduced. On the other hand where there is very little flexibility as with single track lines with few passing loops, the margin needs to be more than 20%. It is felt, therefore, that more work needs to be done on establishing practical, deliverable capacities as a function of the absolute theoretical capacity and a margin to cover the risks of events that may prevent that intensity of use being achieved. This suggestion is no more than a study of the level of unused capacity needed to protect operations from unplanned, untoward events which end in the customers' eyes as unreliability. It is also a suggestion that the investment criteria and the pressure to gain maximum rolling stock and infrastructure utilisation needs to be revisited.

ScotRail

9.3.9 ScotRail emphasised the disparity between the development of services, which had been strong, and the network developments, which had been very limited. There had been a good record in opening new stations or developing new links which had developed additional patronage, some of it quite surprising: the case of commuting from Croy to Edinburgh was cited as a prime example. Although network capacity and extent had been virtually static over the last few years, traffic densities had been built up, by new services (for example, Edinburgh CrossRail), by lengthening trains and by enhancing service frequencies (the prime example being the Edinburgh - Glasgow shuttle). Once the new trains now on order have been delivered, the Central Belt service provision in the weekday peak will have reached its practical maximum. There are very few spare paths and there is very little possibility of lengthening trains any further spare places. If on-train capacity is subsequently reached, it will be very difficult to further enhance capacity. The constraint to further growth is essentially the platform and approach capacities at the terminal stations in Glasgow and Edinburgh, constraints which would be very expensive to lift. The doubts upon the wisdom of lifting them were also there: more peak-hour capacity means accentuating the peak and more assets being under-used in the off-peak.

9.3.10 The general policy of coping with increases in demand by accommodating them on the shoulders of the peak and off-peak was therefore reiterated, together with further emphasis upon system reliability. A system working to its maximum capacity is inherently at risk of knock-on consequences of a wide range of unplanned disruptions, both minor and serious, and some additional capacity is need to cope with them. The new trains currently on order will provide some resilience against rolling stock faults or trains being out of position as a result of earlier disruptive events, particularly on the Edinburgh to Glasgow route. However, the issue of track capacity was still stressed and such things as a minor track circuit fault can provoke a cascade of effects which leads to a temporary reduction in capacity. The solution would seem to be to make the system components more robust by the duplication of crucial units, good stocks of available spares, good maintenance, etc. One particular element affects both stock and infrastructure. Computers and electronics are components of the trains and of the network. Although the hardware may be robust, the software often is not and, moreover, is often updated. Too much reliance is being placed upon software that is both fragile and unstable: a case in point was the problems generated by the coupling and un-coupling of trains, a simple act that often upsets the software and can take a train out of service. There seems to be a case for slowing down technical developments to ensure that systems work rather than developing new functions before the previous ones have reached full reliability.

9.3.11 ScotRail has been developing its policy on train stabling and maintenance. The new trains being delivered have an aggregate length of well over one kilometre, placing stress upon depot capacity. Depots have three functions: they provide stabling, maintenance and a booking-on point for staff. In some cases ScotRail is separating these functions. Dumfries, Helensburgh and Dundee now have stabling and booking-on points, which provide local employment, increases in staff productivity by reducing mileage out of service and greater reliability. There are problems with protecting stabled stock from vandalism and providing re-fuelling facilities, but these can be solved with some investment.

9.3.12 ScotRail, in common with all operators, does have to cope with reductions in theoretical capacity in meeting the requirements of the Disability and the Health and Safety Regulations. Modern trains have to provide facilities for the disabled which take a considerable space and which reduce seating capacity. Health and Safety Regulations impose restrictions on train working, platform lengths, etc which appear to be designed to guard against very small, theoretical risks.

9.3.13 In answer to the specific points raised:

  • ScotRail is building the targets set by National and Local Government into the bid it is making later this year for the renewal of its franchise and will be in a position to respond positively if their bid is successful.
  • The growth in passengers in recent years has been across the entire network but with stronger growth in the Edinburgh area where the vitality of the local economy has generated demand and service improvements have catered for it.
  • Growth everywhere has been off-peak and at weekends as well as in the peak itself. This has been generated by a fares policy to encourage off-peak travel and enhanced frequencies to cope with the result.
  • Overcrowding is most noticeable on the services from Glasgow to the Ayrshire cost and from Edinburgh on the Dunblane, Fife and Bathgate services. In many cases, this is being addressed by lengthening the platforms and trains.
  • Dealing with growth in numbers of passengers should be focused upon the shoulders of the peak and off-peak since the ability to expand peak capacity is very limited, primarily by the ground area of the major stations.
  • Selective door-opening may be given temporary approval subject to guarantees that platforms will be extended. The nature of those guarantees and the identity of those signing them are not yet established.
  • Service cancellations and short-formed services are primarily matters to be addressed through making the infrastructure more robust and flexible. It should fail less often and, when it does fail, the effects should be minimised. This would ensure stock is positioned properly, reducing service cancellations and short formation trains.
  • Further increases in the number of timetabled trains without infrastructure improvements would produce a more fragile service.
  • Additional rolling stock and crews allow longer turnround times and thus more ability to retrieve disturbances to the train-plan, but this is constrained by the numbers of platforms and the possibility of more than one train at a time using them.
  • Although SPT may wish to further expand the fleet of electric multiple units, ScotRail does not think any expansion of the diesel fleet is feasible once the new trains on order are delivered. This is because the overall track capacity and the train fleet are in balance and any extra trains would presume an increase in infrastructure capacity. New, replacement trains would be a matter for the new franchise.
  • There will be further decisions to match stabling and signing-on points to passenger flows but there will probably be ongoing expansion in the number of smaller stabling points at points outwith the major urban areas.
  • There are still a few capacity hot-spots to be dealt with, particularly the provision of an intermediate signal on the Forth Bridge. At present this is prohibited by Health and Safety who are concerned with passenger evacuation on the bridge. However, although that must be a real concern, it is illogical to link it to signal spacing and this logic is being explored.
  • The rise in ScotRail's cancellation rate was a reflection of a combination of the post-Hatfield speed restrictions, a staff dispute and unreliability of the newly delivered trains. The rate is now much improved.

Glasgow Underground

9.3.14 The Underground is a very simple system of two continuously running circles, one clockwise and the other anti-clockwise. There are no junctions, except for access to the stabling and maintenance yard, no terminal problems, very simple signalling, low running speeds and no relationships with other lines. The only perturbations are equipment failures, staff timing errors and/or absence and individual passengers experiencing problems that delay individual (and sometimes following) trains. It could therefore be used as an example of the simplest form of railway operation.

9.3.15 The service is maintained by a stock of 43 carriages made up into 13 trains each of three carriages. This provides four spares to cover routine maintenance and partial cover for equipment failure. Each carriage has 37 seats and 54 standing places giving a place/seats ratio of 2.5. This is far higher than either buses or surface railways but is acceptable since journeys are short. At peak times, there is a train every four minutes giving a capacity of 4,095 passengers per hour in each direction, 1,665 of them seated and the other 2,430 standing. For all but the peak-of-the-peak this is more than sufficient, but at peak commuting times and when either of the Old Firm football teams is playing at home, the system is overcrowded and passengers encounter delays. The problems are not just of train capacity, since many stations have narrow platforms with a risk of people being pushed on to the track. Crowds entering stations are therefore controlled and delays are encountered outside as well as inside the ticket barriers. Although endemic, delays both in entering the station and on the platform and overcrowded trains are not extensive.

9.3.16 The simplicity of the Glasgow Underground system focuses attention upon the issue of defining capacity and the problems associated with it. Much of the provided seat- and place-kilometres is unused, with demand exceeding capacity for well under 200 hours per year. The average inconvenience per passenger carried due to lack of capacity is small, but could feasibly be reduced. Station rebuilding to cope with longer trains and with throughput in the height of the peak would be a massive expense, but the track and infrastructure can cater for additional train paths. Carriages are hand built: the gauge of the tunnels and the curvatures prevent the use of standard dimension, mass-produced stock. Each carriage costs 0.5 million to build, so a three-car train costs 1.5 million. An additional three trains at a total cost of 4.5 million would enable the service frequency to be enhanced from a four-minute headway to a train every three minutes.

9.3.17 This would give an extra 1,365 places per hour in each direction, an increase of a third and enough to reduce the delay and discomfort that passengers endure at peak times but would be unlikely to solve the problem completely. There is evidence from the commuter services in South East London when capacity was increased by lengthening all station platforms and the length of trains, that the intensity of overcrowding in the height of the peak remained constant although the length of time at which the overcrowding occurred shortened.

9.3.18 In the case of the Glasgow Underground the investment of 4.5 million in extra trains and the consequent reduction of headway from four to three minutes would reduce the total discomfort and delay but, it is thought, the peak-of-the-peak would remain the same. This would be particularly true of the surges in football traffic. On the other hand, the extra capacity would increase the total spare, unused capacity at off-peak times with some small mitigation that a three minute headway could attract more passengers, or at least serve to retain existing passengers. The simplicity of the Glasgow Underground makes it possible to make some very rough indicative calculations. The annual amortised cost of three new trains at a capital outlay of 4.5 million, assuming a 10% interest rate and a 30-year vehicle life, would be 477,000 per year. The extra train crew costs would be, say, 100,000 per year, giving a crude estimate of total extra cost of 577,000 year. This amounts to 2,387 per working day. At a value of non-work time of 5 per hour, this would suggest a net saving of 477 passenger-hours per day, over 26,000 minutes. Although merely indicative, this suggests that the possible solution is out of scale with the size of the problem.

9.3.19 The same conclusion may be reached by another route. Annual ridership stands currently at 13.36 million journeys, far less than the annual capacity of the system - it is not possible to place a precise value on the system capacity due to the large number of variables involved, but clearly if an intensive service was operated continually then the system would be able to cater for significantly more passengers. The patronage target set by SPT is 15 million journeys per annum, an increase of 12.25%. If this increase were to happen evenly throughout the day and peak flows were to increase at this rate, the lack of capacity would worsen both in intensity and in extent and the existing overcrowding and delay would increase. However, the SPT policy is to induce more off-peak travel and to achieve the target increase by using the existing unused capacity. This policy, then, is not to increase the annual capacity but to even out demand to match the almost constant capacity of the existing system.

9.3.20 The Glasgow Underground therefore brings into question the definition of capacity. If the definition is the annual or even daily capacity, then most transport systems show an element of under-utilisation. It then follows that increases in demand may be satisfied so long as they are not at the peak. If, however, capacity is defined as the excess of demand over the ability to carry it without undue discomfort and delay, then the implied policy is to increase peak capacity, a policy which is likely to heighten the peak. Naturally the real problem is not quite so stark. Some system enhancement may be at a low enough cost to warrant an enhanced capacity to deal with the peak: the purchase of new trains for the Glasgow Underground may be within this definition although the immediate benefits do not appear to offer a prima facie case - work on the value of reduced waiting times and overcrowding and the numbers of people affected would seem to be necessary. However, heavy investment in station reconstruction to provide longer and wider platforms would almost certainly be poor value for money

9.3.21 The simplicity of the Glasgow Underground and the rather uncluttered analysis that it shows does seem to offer a more general conclusion. The ability to cope with the demands specified in the Local Transport Strategies depends very much upon the nature of the anticipated increase. Most transport systems are well able to cope with increases in total demand and it is in their interests to do so. The distribution of fixed costs over more travellers tends to reduce total cost per journey. In general the marginal cost of extra off-peak travel is comparatively low: on Glasgow Underground it is virtually nil. Hence policies and targets to cope with increased travel whilst evening out demand are very attractive. On the other hand, if the targets are to cope with more peak-time commuter travel, the substantial investments required will drive marginal cost above average cost so worsening the financial state of public transport. Of course, this is insufficient argument for abandoning such investment: there may be social and other benefits to be taken into account.

Page updated: Friday, April 07, 2006