Scottish Government

SCOTTISH STRATEGIC RAIL STUDY

10. SUMMARY

Future Demand for Rail Travel

10.1 Under our central economic and planning scenario the analysis has shown that demand for rail travel within the study area is expected to increase by 17m over the next twenty years, from around 48m ²⁸ in 2000 to over 65m by 2020, simply as a result of background economic, demographic and social change.

10.2 Whilst it might be tempting to conclude from this that the rail industry does not have to do very much to see an increase in patronage approaching 40% over the next 20 years, simply addressing the current infrastructure constraints and providing the system capacity to cope with this growth will require a significant commitment of resources.

10.3 However, it is clear from the preceding analysis that this alone will not be a sufficient course of action if the objectives of the Scottish Executive and the stakeholders in the rail industry are to be met and that further investment will be needed if the vision for rail is to be achieved.

10.4 We have used three scenarios (high, medium and low) to test what might be achieved with different scales of investment. While we have noted throughout this document that the scenarios were developed to enable us to understand the relative performance of various packages of schemes and that these scenarios do not, in the round, represent an 'optimal' investment package, the study area demand forecasts shown in Table 10.1 are, nevertheless, indicative of the scale of impact that might be achieved.

10.5 The schemes considered within the low resource scenario would add only another 2m trips in 2020 but would improve the travelling conditions for existing peak period travellers significantly. If the schemes in the medium resource scenario were implemented they would add another 20m trips per year by 2020 to those in the low resource scenario, while if the schemes tested in the high resource scenario were implemented as tested, demand would grow by a further 9 million per year. The total number of journeys by rail could therefore reach as high as 96m by 2020, or just over double the current number of rail trips within the study area.

10.6 It is important to note that the implications of this growth are not solely confined to the lines in the study area as it will also impact upon other routes in Scotland, such as the Highland line.

Table 10.1 Summary Of annual Passenger Journeys Within The Study Area Do-Minimum, HRS, MRS and LRS (000s)

Factors that Could Affect the Demand Forecasts

10.7 To assess the robustness of these forecasts a number of sensitivity tests were undertaken (WP's 4 & 7).

Implications of Economic and Planning Forecasts

10.8 Of these tests, the most significant was found to be the planning data that drives the background growth forecasts. For consistency this study uses the CSTM3A planning data that has been used for the parallel Scottish Executive studies.

10.9 However, using the national (TEMPRO) forecasts for local population, employment and economic conditions rather than the Glasgow and Clyde Valley Structure Plan forecasts contained within CSTM3A reduces the overall Do-minimum forecast to around 57m in 2020, or one half of the growth shown in Table 10.1. Travel to/from the SPT area is most greatly affected by this but as the largest attractor and generator of rail trips in Scotland the knock-on effect of lower than expected activity in the SPT area spreads to travel to/from all of the regions ( Chapter 3).

10.10 The general implications of this are largely associated with phasing/timing and re-distribution rather than fundamentally altering the direction of the strategy. The introduction of some of the overcrowding relief measures would be delayed, as would the introduction of many of the other investment measures, while the re-distributional impact would arise from the fact that the investment schemes most directly affected would be those in, or affecting travel to/from, the SPT area.

10.11 The under-reporting within the CAPRI rail ticket database of rail travel in the SPT area is likely to be a counter-vailing influence to this that could improve the economic performance of some of the projects assessed, ( WP2 and footnote 4, Chapter 3), making it difficult to draw firm conclusions on the implications for the SPT area. However, the general implication is that the timing of investments might be delayed if the economy and the proposals for land use development do not follow the pattern set out in the GCVSP.

Sensitivity to Journey Times, Service Quality and Fares

10.12 As well as the specific investment proposals described and appraised in the three scenarios, we have also tested ²⁹ the demand implications of a number of more 'generic' options for improving rail services - adjusting fares, journey times and improving quality.

10.13 Enhancing service quality (better integration, information provision, rolling stock and station quality etc) has been identified in this study as an important planning objective, reflecting the need to enhance the overall 'travel experience,' for rail customers. The analysis (WP7) suggests that a package of quality enhancements across the network could increase MRS demand by 3m passengers pa in 2010 (+4%). This would increase the present value of the benefits of the MRS by 191m (+13%), indicating that these quality improvements, which are important planning objectives for the SSRS, would be worth pursuing in value for money terms if they can be delivered for less than 190m PV (approximately 13% of the combined capital and operating cost of the MRS).

10.14 Further tests on fares and journey times were undertaken to assess the robustness of the central forecasts. The fares test included a 15% average fares reduction on long distance services across the study area and a five percent increase in all fares across the study area ³⁰.

10.15 A 15% fares reduction for inter regional services would increase overall rail patronage by 0.4m pa in 2010 and increase the PV of the benefits of the MRS by 38 million (3%). The potential effect of an across-the- board 5% average fares increase would increase annual fares revenue by 1.3 million per year in 2010. However, this would also lead to large reductions in the number of journeys and passenger miles by rail (-2.5 million and -49 million respectively), and as consequence the overall incremental PV of benefits would be negative at -48 million.

10.16 We have also looked at how sensitive demand might be to improvements in journey time, in particular for long distance journeys where the planning objectives indicated that a priority was to increase competitiveness with car journey times. A simple test, which included a 15% reduction in journey times on all long-distance movements, added almost 0.2m (+18%) long distance trips to the network in 2010 and increased the PV of benefits by an estimated 82 million.

Value For Money

10.17 As is the case with the overall scenario demand forecasts, it is important not to read too much into the economic appraisal results of the three scenarios presented in Table 10.2. Each scenario contains some high performing schemes and, particularly in the HRS, some poor performing schemes. The analyses presented in Working Papers 6 to 8 have shown how repackaging some projects and replacing others could improve their performance.

10.18 It is also important to recognise that the strategic forecasting and appraisal approach used in this study is aimed at gaining an understanding of the relative performance of projects rather than predicting their absolute performance.

10.19 Nevertheless, it is reasonable to ask what is likely to be the value for money of the investment required to lever in the additional rail patronage over and above the background growth and to that end Table 10.2 summarises the economic indicators for each of the (non-optimised) scenarios.

Table 10.2 Economic Appraisal of (non-optimised) scenarios

10.20 Unsurprisingly as it includes several capital-intensive projects and a number of schemes that subsequently were shown to be particularly poor value for money, the HRS has the poorest economic performance.

10.21 The MRS which is a little closer to an 'optimised' HRS, in the sense that the poor performing HRS schemes were excluded from it performs better, as does the LRS. Indeed the LRS might have been expected to do better still - the analysis in WP8 suggests that the train lengthening projects within the LRS perform better than the average for the scenario - but that other elements of the scenario pull the overall performance down.

10.22 Nevertheless, in the context of a twenty year strategy, these scenarios, even if they were optimised would not necessarily be considered as alternatives. The LRS is largely concerned with things that can be achieved within the next three to five years and this sets it apart from the other two scenarios. Which path is then pursued will depend on the scale of funding that is available. There are some elements of substitution between the MRS and HRS and some of the key issues that need to be considered here are set out below.

Key Issues - SESTRAN Area

10.23 The key issue in the SESTRAN area is what scale of upgrade to provide at Waverley as this project determines most of what can be achieved elsewhere in the area and also influences many of the decisions on Inter Regional traffic. Our analysis suggests that the +11 peak tph option would generate the highest level of achievement against planning objectives and the best economic case of the packages considered.

10.24 Linked to this is the decision on the Edinburgh Airport rail link. The full scheme with a sub-surface station in conjunction with the full Waverley upgrade would add significant capability to the system, would do particularly well against planning objectives and generate a high level of demand and revenue but has a very high capital cost. Conversely, the 4tph Airport shuttle service tested in the MRS takes up a significant proportion of the additional capacity provided by an enhanced Waverley and limits the scope for other Inter Regional and SESTRAN to SPT services. The decisions on the airport rail link are therefore highly germane to the future rail strategy.

Key Issues - SPT Area

10.25 The key issue in SPT is the central area capacity problem and decisions on the two facilitating projects - City Tunnel and City Union - that have been considered here. The lower cost City Union/Strathbungo Link appears to offer a stronger value for money case than the City Tunnel project, but the latter makes a much greater contribution to planning objectives, not just in the west of the Central Belt, but for the Inter Regional, Tay and NESTRANS areas as well.

10.26 These are not competing schemes. Their relative costs, and the scale of their impacts are of different orders of magnitude. Fundamentally, there is relatively little scope to increase peak service frequencies in the SPT area without addressing the Glasgow Central High Level capacity constraint. The City Tunnel project would do that, the City Union project, whilst a worthwhile project in its own right, would not, particularly if the Glasgow Airport shuttle service is introduced. In the context of a twenty year strategy for the largest rail network outside London this particular issue has to be addressed.

Key Issues Tay, NESTRANS and Inter Regional Services

10.27 In NESTRANS an important consideration is that the Crossrail service as envisaged is dependent upon the delivery of capacity upgrade outside of the study area, on the Inverness-Aberdeen line. However, the key issue in both the Tay and the NESTRANS areas is finding a way to link the proposals for Crossrail projects in Dundee and Aberdeen into a joint package with the express and InterCity services.

10.28 Both Crossrail services perform well against the planning objectives for their respective areas, but poorly in value for money terms when assessed as stand alone projects. The best prospect for delivering these two projects is to consider them as 'enabling' projects which, through a service recast into distinct express and local services, allow improvements in Inter Regional express journey times to be achieved. This may prove to be the most cost-effective way of obtaining faster Inter Regional services whilst at the same time meeting the planning objectives for the Tay and NESTRANS areas.

Achieving the Vision - The Priorities

10.29 Finally, we consider how the findings of the area-by-area analysis can be drawn together into a strategy for the whole of the study area. We noted in Chapter Four that there were three strategic outcomes that needed to be achieved if the vision for rail, repeated below, was to be achieved.

10.30 These were:

• To expand the capability of the existing rail system;
• To make rail use easier for the customer;
• To develop new markets for rail.

10.31 'Generic' strategies for achieving these outcomes were set out in Chapter 4. The analysis presented area by area in the subsequent chapters has enabled us to firm up the generic strategies with examples of the types of specific project that could form part of these strategies.

10.32 The projects noted here, for each of the three strategic outcomes, are merely examples taken from the large number of projects appraised during this study. This is not meant to be a definitive or exhaustive list, and the omission of a particular project from it should not be considered significant. However, the three tables below illustrate how the projects contribute towards the strategic outcomes and on what sort of timescale they may be most appropriately considered.

TABLE 10.3 STRATEGIC OUTCOMES