Scottish Executive Response to: Lessons to be Learned; Royal Society; and Royal Society of Edinburgh Inquiries into Foot and Mouth Disease
3c. KEEPING OUT DISEASE AGENTS
IMPORTS
49. It is recognised that the FMD virus is most likely to have arrived in the UK by the illegal import of animal products. The existence of illegal imports is of real concern to industry and Government alike and the Scottish Executive is working closely with the UK Government to deliver increased detection and prevention of illegal imports.
LL R12: We recommend that the Government ensure that best practice from import regimes elsewhere be incorporated with domestic practices where appropriate. (p47) |
50. It is the Scottish Executive's view that import controls and regulations designed to control animal disease are best dealt with on a UK basis. For its part, the Executive accepts the recommendation that best practice be identified and incorporated into domestic controls. To this end the Executive is co-operating fully with a Cabinet Office review of the whole issue of illegal meat and plant imports. This involves all three devolved administrations, all Whitehall Departments with an interest, Port Health Authorities and local authorities. The review will examine the control measures used in other countries, particularly Australia, New Zealand and the USA.
LL R14: We recommend that DEFRA be given responsibility for co-ordinating all the activities of Government to step up efforts to keep illegal meat imports out of the country. This should include better regulations and improved surveillance on illegal imports of meat and meat products. (p48) RS 5.2: DEFRA should promote the speedy implementation of the Action Plan on illegal importing and of a much more co-ordinated approach at all levels by all bodies concerned with import control. (p54) RSE 12: The Government should carry out up-to-date assessments of risks in the light of the international situation; and that high priority be given to surveillance at points of entry to the UK, at markets, abattoirs and on farms. (para 137) |
51. The Scottish Executive accepts the recommendation that DEFRA should lead in co-ordinating action against illegal meat imports, and will be collaborating fully at policy and operational level to ensure that this work is implemented rapidly and effectively. A full and detailed risk assessment has been commissioned. Its report, which is is due in the autumn, will inform DEFRA, the devolved administrations and other agencies where resources should best be targeted. This work will meet the recommendation of the Royal Society of Edinburgh concerning risk assessment and surveillance at point of entry. Concurrent with this is a publicity campaign designed to increase awareness of the disease risk of imported products. Other deterrents will be examined in the light of the risk assessment.
LL R13: We recommend that the European Commission lead a targeted risk based approach designed to keep FMD out of EU Member States. The UK should work alongside other EU Member States to highlight areas of greater risk. (p47) LL R64: We recommend that the UK urge the OIE to consider the implications, for the detection and control of FMD, of the removal of swine vesicular disease from the List A of Notifiable diseases. (p156) |
52. The Scottish Executive shares the concern of other UK administrations and the EU that a new outbreak of disease may occur at any time, given the global incidence of many diseases. The accession of ten more countries to the EU in 2004 will create a longer land border across which disease may cross. The EU and the OIE are aware of these threats and monitor the location and movement pattern of major animal diseases. Swine Vesicular Disease is of particular importance because it resembles FMD in pigs, and is only distinguishable by lab testing. In order to characterise the threat to the UK more fully, the Government has commissioned an assessment of the risk of incursion of serious diseases including FMD. The results of this will be shared within the UK and with the EU.
RSE 11: The UK Government should press the EU to end the concession on the personal import of cooked meat into any member state from countries outside the Single Market and the European Economic Area and to impose stringent methods of inspection. (para 131) |
53. The Scottish Executive accepts that personal imports of meat and meat products from third countries should no longer be permitted as such imports carry too significant a risk of disease. The UK government has already taken steps to secure a ban on personal meat imports and a draft EU regulation has been produced which will be in force from January 2003. This ban will enable improved enforcement and publicity.
SURVEILLANCE
54. Veterinary surveillance is critical in maintaining disease awareness and detecting emerging diseases. The Scottish Executive accepts that improved surveillance at all levels - international and domestic - needs to be developed. The topic was under review at the beginning of 2001 but work was interrupted by the needs of the disease control effort for classical swine fever and FMD. However, work on the Surveillance Strategy is an ongoing UK effort and a draft strategy will be published later this year.
International Surveillance
RS R1.2: The Prime Minister should establish a formal procedure to review at three-yearly intervals: the level of threat from imported animal diseases of livestock changes in livestock farming practices that could affect vulnerability to disease scientific and therapeutic advances that could affect policy options the UK's and Europe's state of preparedness. (p1)
RS 3.1: DEFRA should undertake a systematic analysis of the information available on the relative threats to the UK from the range of disease covered here (and other significant diseases such as TSEs and TB), taking into account the impact of globalisation and climate change in order to set priorities for the national strategy for animal disease and surveillance. |
RS 5.1: DEFRA should propose an EU wide risk assessment unit and centralised database on surveillance and disease data, and a review of the bodies that provide early warning of animal disease threats. (p54) |
55. The Scottish Executive shares the concerns of the Inquiries regarding the threat of disease from external sources. It sees early warning of disease movement as a key factor in mobilising other defences, very much on the principle of "forewarned is forearmed". The Executive will be working with other administrations in support of these recommendations. The detailed Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) risk assessment of FMD virus entering the UK via imported meat will be shared with the European Commission to help develop future EU wide policy. Reflecting its animal health responsibilities, the Scottish Executive will ensure that Scottish stakeholders are kept informed about the risk of disease outbreaks and scientific developments and will work with them to ensure that changes in farming practice are reflected in future policy.
56. An Information Management system is being developed to capture data on new disease outbreaks in livestock around the world. This will be linked to a GIS (Geographical Information System) facility to map the emerging threats and inform policy directions.
UK Surveillance
LL R67: We recommend that in developing the surveillance strategy, there be the widest possible involvement of those with a role to play in surveillance. (p160) LL R66: The State Veterinary Service, together with the Pirbright Laboratory, should increase their horizon scanning and threat assessment capabilities for major infectious animal diseases. (p160) |
57. The Scottish Executive supports these recommendations and is participating in the development of a UK veterinary surveillance strategy. The surveillance strategy recognises the importance of strengthening links between those involved in the delivery of surveillance and will prioritise horizon scanning for new or changing disease threats. The strategy will involve working in close partnership with the national reference laboratory at IAH Pirbright.
58. The strategy aims to integrate currently held animal disease data with other relevant population, geographic and meteorological data. An integrated database will also support serosurveillance programmes designed to demonstrate freedom from disease.